Chapter II — WAGING WAR

[Ts’ao Kung has the note: “He who wishes to fight must first count the
cost,” which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is
not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of
ways and means.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a
thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
mail-clad soldiers,

[The “swift chariots” were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for
the attack; the “heavy chariots” were heavier, and designed for purposes of
defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this
seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early
Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot
was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped
a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we
are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each
heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a
thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,

[2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since
Sun Tzŭ’s time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests,
small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will
reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of
raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s
weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a
town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be
equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength
exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert
the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been
seen associated with long delays.

[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the
commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and
Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally
stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says:
“Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and
treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in
their train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations
mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and
distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of
such calamities.” Chang Yu says: “So long as victory can be attained, stupid
haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness.” Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever,
except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than
ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more
guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can
never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to
the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic
example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general
deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s
isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to
suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot
question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run.
Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative
presumption in their favour.]

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can
thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long
war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close.
Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but it fits well into
the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, “He who does not know the
evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,” is distinctly pointless.]

8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his
supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but
crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy
to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon
Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your
opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the
nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.]

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the
army will have food enough for its needs.

[The Chinese word translated here as “war material” literally means “things to
be used”, and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of
an army, apart from provisions.]

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance
causes the people to be impoverished.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though
obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I
cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to
Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense, and we
get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the
cause of the people’s impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by
which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But
why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the
State or Government is too poor to do so?]

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and
high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own territory.
Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the
frontier.]

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by
heavy exactions.

13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of
the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be
dissipated;

[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of
7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho
Shih has a characteristic tag: “The people being regarded as the essential part
of the State, and food as the people’s heaven, is it not right that those in
authority should value and be careful of both?”]

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates
and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets,
draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload
of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a
single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one
cartload to the front. A picul is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5
kilograms).]

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there
may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

[Tu Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the
advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy,
they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to
fight, each on his own account.”]

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken,
those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be
substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in
conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

[As Ho Shih remarks: “War is not a thing to be trifled with.” Sun Tzŭ here
reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.”]

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the
people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace
or in peril.