Chapter VIII — VARIATION OF TACTICS

[The heading means literally “The Nine Variations,” but as Sun Tzŭ does not
appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (V §§ 6-11)
that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we
have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that “Nine” stands for an
indefinitely large number. “All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary
our tactics to the utmost degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes
these Nine Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are
connected with the Nine Situations” – of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by
Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been
lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends
some weight.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign,
collects his army and concentrates his forces.

[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been
interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.]

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads
intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated
positions.

[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning
of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this
situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li
Ch’uan says it is “country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks
or herds, vegetables or firewood;” Chia Lin, “one of gorges, chasms and
precipices, without a road by which to advance.”]

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position,
you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

[“Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch’uan,
“where an ambush is to be feared.”]

armies which must be not attacked,

[More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be attacked.”
Ch’en Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a rival advantage, but
are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of
overtaxing your men’s strength.”]

towns which must not be besieged,

[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own
experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of
Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the
country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no
fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: “No town should
be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause
any trouble.” Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: “The city is
small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great
feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.” In the
seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was
Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and
manœuvers. He said: “It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when
the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province.” [1] ]

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not
be obeyed.

[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and
Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are baleful
instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the
negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even
Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.]

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the
configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to
practical account.

[Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only securing
good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible
way. Chang Yu says: “Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural
features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is
possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical
knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?”]

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his
plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make
the best use of his men.

[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous
lines of action, namely: “if a certain road is short, it must be followed; if
an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition,
it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if
consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed.” But
there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these
advantages. For instance, “a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but
if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an
ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to
attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with
desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on.]

7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together.

[“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says
Ts’ao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to your mind.”]

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in
accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

[Tu Mu says: “If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix
our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing
some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations.”]

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to
seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

[Tu Mu says: “If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must
consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to
gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations
are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself…. For instance; if I
am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the
nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it
would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and
use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils.” See the
story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.]

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which
would only occur to the Oriental mind:—”Entice away the enemy’s best and
wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into
his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue
and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By
means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and
waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into
excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.”
Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzŭ here:
“Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit
of his own accord.”]

and make trouble for them,

[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be
made for the enemy affecting their “possessions,” or, as we might say,
“assets,” which he considers to be “a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony
amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands.” These give us a
whip-hand over the enemy.]

and keep them constantly engaged;

[Literally, “make servants of them.” Tu Yu says “prevent them from having any
rest.”]

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use of: “cause
them to forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first
impulse), and hasten in our direction.”]

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not
coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not
attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

[“Bravery without forethought,” as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes a
man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says
Chang Yu, “must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an
ambush and slain.” Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.: “In estimating the character
of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage,
forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general
should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who
fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be
condemned.” Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark: “Simply going to one’s
death does not bring about victory.”]

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as “cowardice” as
being of the man “whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage,”
and Wang Hsi adds “who is quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Meng Shih
gives the closer paraphrase “he who is bent on returning alive,” this is, the
man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved
in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: “He who lets
an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.” In 404
A.D., Liu Yu pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval
battle with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered
only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan
Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be overcome, had a
light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if
necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting
spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an
attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be
first in the fray, Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their
baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a
somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who
during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in
readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to
get across.]

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Teng
Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight.
Teng Ch’iang said: “Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily
provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will
grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to
be our prey.” This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured
as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and
slain.]

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a
general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to
slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however
undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically:
“The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion.”]

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of the
welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger of sacrificing
any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a
shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from
the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the
consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve
a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his
military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated efforts to
relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders
which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very
man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the
interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one
of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I
remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always “so good to his
men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun
Tzŭ’s mouth.]

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of
war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be
found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

[1] “Marshal Turenne,” p. 50.