Chapter X — TERRAIN

[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with “terrain,”
the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The “six calamities” are
discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere string of
desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1)
Accessible ground;

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: “plentifully provided with roads and means of
communications.”]

(2) entangling ground;

[The same commentator says: “Net-like country, venturing into which you become
entangled.”]

(3) temporising ground;

[Ground which allows you to “stave off” or “delay.”]

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance
from the enemy.

[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A
strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s unquestioning
acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.]

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
accessible.

3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the
raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.

[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, “not to
allow the enemy to cut your communications.” In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the
secret of war lies in the communications,” [1] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had
done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10,
VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: “The line of supply may be said to be as vital
to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as
the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death,
and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements,
and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose
communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and
he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his
force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior
numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will
not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole
army.” [2]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally
forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first
move, it is called temporising ground.

[Tu Mu says: “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the situation
remains at a deadlock.”]

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an
attractive bait,

[Tu Yu says, “turning their backs on us and pretending to flee.” But this is
only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our position.]

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
our attack with advantage.

8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be
strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, “the initiative will lie with us, and by
making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.”]

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if
the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him
to come up.

[Ts’ao Kung says: “The particular advantage of securing heights and
defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy.” [For the
enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the
following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a
punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At night he pitched his camp as
usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when
suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near
by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against
the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien,
however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly
as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their
former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant
officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong.
‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien
replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking
unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen,” Chang Yu continues, “that
high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because
they are immune from disastrous floods.”]

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat
and try to entice him away.

[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the two
rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of
Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te
persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken
prisoner. See Chiu T’ang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of
the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,

[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and wearisome march,
at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, “we should be exhausted and our adversary
fresh and keen.”]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

[Or perhaps, “the principles relating to ground.” See, however, I. § 8.]

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural
causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1)
Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6)
rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten
times its size, the result will be the flight of the former.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the
result is insubordination.

[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [Hsin T’ang Shu, ch.
148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang
T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers
treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by
riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu
was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had
passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and
dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide
by cutting his throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result
is collapse.

[Ts’ao Kung says: “The officers are energetic and want to press on, the
common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse.”]

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the
commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the
result is ruin.

[Wang Hsi’s note is: “This means, the general is angry without cause, and
at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers;
thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his
head.”]

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not
clear and distinct;

[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: “If the commander gives his orders with decision,
the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without
vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.”
General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words: “The secret of getting
successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the
clearness of the instructions they receive.” [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: “the
most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that
befall an army arise from hesitation.”]

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

[Tu Mu says: “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine.”]

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter
disorganisation.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior
force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful
one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must
be a rout.

[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues: “Whenever
there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve
in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men
and to demoralize the enemy.” Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar (“De Bello
Gallico,” V. 28, 44, et al.).]

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the
general who has attained a responsible post.

[See supra, § 13.]

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

[Ch’en Hao says: “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to
those connected with ground.”]

but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory,
and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes
the test of a great general.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into
practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will
surely be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though
the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not
fight even at the ruler’s bidding.

[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said to
have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the San Lueh, has these
words attributed to him: “The responsibility of setting an army in motion must
devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the
Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and
the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their
country’s cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel].” This means that
“in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander
must be absolute.” Chang Yu also quote the saying: “Decrees from the Son of
Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.”]

24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing
disgrace,

[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a
soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his
sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.” Such a
man, says Ho Shih, “even if he had to suffer punishment, would not regret his
conduct.”]

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the
deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand
by you even unto death.

[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of the
famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have frequently had
occasion to quote: “He wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the
meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to
sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every
hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and
Wu Ch’i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this,
began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your
son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked
the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu
performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and
finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the
same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.’” Li Ch’uan
mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao
during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: “Many of the soldiers are
suffering severely from the cold.” So he made a round of the whole army,
comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they were
clothed in garments lined with floss silk.]

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt;
kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of
quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they
are useless for any practical purpose.

[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you, they
would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military
discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of
Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the
inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain
officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-townsman,
ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order
to wear it over his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng
considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be
allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered
his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so.
This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time
forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up.]

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware
that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.

[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, “the issue in this case is uncertain.”]

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own
men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.

[Cf. III. § 13 (1).]

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are
in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes
fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he
has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures so
thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does not move recklessly,” says
Chang Yu, “so that when he does move, he makes no mistakes.”]

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory
will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your
victory complete.

[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: “Given a knowledge of three
things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural
advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles.”]

[1] See “Pensees de Napoleon 1er,” no. 47.

[2] “The Science of War,” chap. 2.

[3] “Aids to Scouting,” p. xii.