BOOK EIGHTH.

Argument

AUGUSTINE COMES NOW TO THE THIRD KIND OF THEOLOGY, THAT IS, THE
NATURAL, AND TAKES UP THE QUESTION, WHETHER THE WORSHIP OF
THE GODS OF THE NATURAL THEOLOGY IS OF ANY AVAIL TOWARDS
SECURING BLESSEDNESS IN THE LIFE TO COME. THIS QUESTION HE
PREFERS TO DISCUSS WITH THE PLATONISTS, BECAUSE THE PLATONIC
SYSTEM IS “FACILE PRINCEPS” AMONG PHILOSOPHIES, AND MAKES THE
NEAREST APPROXIMATION TO CHRISTIAN TRUTH. IN PURSUING THIS
ARGUMENT, HE FIRST REFUTES APULEIUS, AND ALL WHO MAINTAIN THAT
THE DEMONS SHOULD BE WORSHIPPED AS MESSENGERS AND MEDIATORS
BETWEEN GODS AND MEN; DEMONSTRATING THAT BY NO POSSIBILITY CAN
MEN BE RECONCILED TO GOOD GODS BY DEMONS, WHO ARE THE SLAVES OF
VICE, AND WHO DELIGHT IN AND PATRONIZE WHAT GOOD AND WISE
MEN ABHOR AND CONDEMN,—THE BLASPHEMOUS FICTIONS OF POETS,
THEATRICAL EXHIBITIONS, AND MAGICAL ARTS.

1. That the question of natural theology is to be discussed with those philosophers
who sought a more excellent wisdom.

We shall require to apply our mind with far greater
intensity to the present question than was requisite
in the solution and unfolding of the questions handled in the
preceding books; for it is not with ordinary men, but with
philosophers that we must confer concerning the theology
which they call natural. For it is not like the fabulous, that
is, the theatrical; nor the civil, that is, the urban theology:
the one of which displays the crimes of the gods, whilst the
other manifests their criminal desires, which demonstrate them
to be rather malign demons than gods. It is, we say, with
philosophers we have to confer with respect to this theology,—men
whose very name, if rendered into Latin, signifies those
who profess the love of wisdom. Now, if wisdom is God,
who made all things, as is attested by the divine authority
and truth,[291] then the philosopher is a lover of God. But since
the thing itself, which is called by this name, exists not in all
who glory in the name,—for it does not follow, of course, that[Pg 306]
all who are called philosophers are lovers of true wisdom,—we
must needs select from the number of those with whose
opinions we have been able to acquaint ourselves by reading,
some with whom we may not unworthily engage in the treatment
of this question. For I have not in this work undertaken
to refute all the vain opinions of the philosophers,
but only such as pertain to theology, which Greek word we
understand to mean an account or explanation of the divine
nature. Nor, again, have I undertaken to refute all the vain
theological opinions of all the philosophers, but only of such
of them as, agreeing in the belief that there is a divine nature,
and that this divine nature is concerned about human affairs,
do nevertheless deny that the worship of the one unchangeable
God is sufficient for the obtaining of a blessed life after death,
as well as at the present time; and hold that, in order to
obtain that life, many gods, created, indeed, and appointed to
their several spheres by that one God, are to be worshipped.
These approach nearer to the truth than even Varro; for,
whilst he saw no difficulty in extending natural theology in
its entirety even to the world and the soul of the world, these
acknowledge God as existing above all that is of the nature of
soul, and as the Creator not only of this visible world, which
is often called heaven and earth, but also of every soul whatsoever,
and as Him who gives blessedness to the rational soul,—of
which kind is the human soul,—by participation in His
own unchangeable and incorporeal light. There is no one,
who has even a slender knowledge of these things, who does
not know of the Platonic philosophers, who derive their name
from their master Plato. Concerning this Plato, then, I will
briefly state such things as I deem necessary to the present
question, mentioning beforehand those who preceded him in
time in the same department of literature.

2. Concerning the two schools of philosophers, that is, the Italic and Ionic, and
their founders.

As far as concerns the literature of the Greeks, whose
language holds a more illustrious place than any of the languages
of the other nations, history mentions two schools of
philosophers, the one called the Italic school, originating in
that part of Italy which was formerly called Magna Græcia;[Pg 307]
the other called the Ionic school, having its origin in those
regions which are still called by the name of Greece. The
Italic school had for its founder Pythagoras of Samos, to whom
also the term “philosophy” is said to owe its origin. For
whereas formerly those who seemed to excel others by the
laudable manner in which they regulated their lives were
called sages, Pythagoras, on being asked what he professed,
replied that he was a philosopher, that is, a student or lover
of wisdom; for it seemed to him to be the height of arrogance
to profess oneself a sage.[292] The founder of the Ionic school,
again, was Thales of Miletus, one of those seven who were
styled the “seven sages,” of whom six were distinguished by
the kind of life they lived, and by certain maxims which they
gave forth for the proper conduct of life. Thales was distinguished
as an investigator into the nature of things; and, in
order that he might have successors in his school, he committed
his dissertations to writing. That, however, which
especially rendered him eminent was his ability, by means of
astronomical calculations, even to predict eclipses of the sun
and moon. He thought, however, that water was the first
principle of things, and that of it all the elements of the
world, the world itself, and all things which are generated in
it, ultimately consist. Over all this work, however, which,
when we consider the world, appears so admirable, he set
nothing of the nature of divine mind. To him succeeded
Anaximander, his pupil, who held a different opinion concerning
the nature of things; for he did not hold that all things
spring from one principle, as Thales did, who held that principle
to be water, but thought that each thing springs from its
own proper principle. These principles of things he believed
to be infinite in number, and thought that they generated
innumerable worlds, and all the things which arise in them.
He thought, also, that these worlds are subject to a perpetual
process of alternate dissolution and regeneration, each one
continuing for a longer or shorter period of time, according
to the nature of the case; nor did he, any more than Thales,
attribute anything to a divine mind in the production of all
this activity of things. Anaximander left as his successor his[Pg 308]
disciple Anaximenes, who attributed all the causes of things
to an infinite air. He neither denied nor ignored the existence
of gods, but, so far from believing that the air was made by
them, he held, on the contrary, that they sprang from the air.
Anaxagoras, however, who was his pupil, perceived that a
divine mind was the productive cause of all things which we
see, and said that all the various kinds of things, according
to their several modes and species, were produced out of an
infinite matter consisting of homogeneous particles, but by the
efficiency of a divine mind. Diogenes, also, another pupil of
Anaximenes, said that a certain air was the original substance
of things out of which all things were produced, but that it
was possessed of a divine reason, without which nothing could
be produced from it. Anaxagoras was succeeded by his disciple
Archelaus, who also thought that all things consisted of
homogeneous particles, of which each particular thing was
made, but that those particles were pervaded by a divine
mind, which perpetually energized all the eternal bodies,
namely, those particles, so that they are alternately united
and separated. Socrates, the master of Plato, is said to have
been the disciple of Archelaus; and on Plato’s account it is
that I have given this brief historical sketch of the whole
history of these schools.

3. Of the Socratic philosophy.

Socrates is said to have been the first who directed the
entire effort of philosophy to the correction and regulation of
manners, all who went before him having expended their
greatest efforts in the investigation of physical, that is, natural
phenomena. However, it seems to me that it cannot be
certainly discovered whether Socrates did this because he was
wearied of obscure and uncertain things, and so wished to
direct his mind to the discovery of something manifest and
certain, which was necessary in order to the obtaining of a
blessed life,—that one great object toward which the labour,
vigilance, and industry of all philosophers seem to have been
directed,—or whether (as some yet more favourable to him
suppose) he did it because he was unwilling that minds
defiled with earthly desires should essay to raise themselves
upward to divine things. For he saw that the causes of[Pg 309]
things were sought for by them,—which causes he believed to
be ultimately reducible to nothing else than the will of the
one true and supreme God,—and on this account he thought
they could only be comprehended by a purified mind; and
therefore that all diligence ought to be given to the purification
of the life by good morals, in order that the mind,
delivered from the depressing weight of lusts, might raise
itself upward by its native vigour to eternal things, and
might, with purified understanding, contemplate that nature
which is incorporeal and unchangeable light, where live the
causes of all created natures. It is evident, however, that
he hunted out and pursued, with a wonderful pleasantness
of style and argument, and with a most pointed and insinuating
urbanity, the foolishness of ignorant men, who thought
that they knew this or that,—sometimes confessing his own
ignorance, and sometimes dissimulating his knowledge, even
in those very moral questions to which he seems to have
directed the whole force of his mind. And hence there arose
hostility against him, which ended in his being calumniously
impeached, and condemned to death. Afterwards, however,
that very city of the Athenians, which had publicly condemned
him, did publicly bewail him,—the popular indignation
having turned with such vehemence on his accusers, that
one of them perished by the violence of the multitude, whilst
the other only escaped a like punishment by voluntary and
perpetual exile.

Illustrious, therefore, both in his life and in his death,
Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy, who
vied with one another in desire for proficiency in handling
those moral questions which concern the chief good
(summum bonum), the possession of which can make a man
blessed; and because, in the disputations of Socrates, where
he raises all manner of questions, makes assertions, and
then demolishes them, it did not evidently appear what he
held to be the chief good, every one took from these disputations
what pleased him best, and every one placed the
final good[293] in whatever it appeared to himself to consist.
Now, that which is called the final good is that at which,[Pg 310]
when one has arrived, he is blessed. But so diverse were
the opinions held by those followers of Socrates concerning
this final good, that (a thing scarcely to be credited with
respect to the followers of one master) some placed the chief
good in pleasure, as Aristippus, others in virtue, as Antisthenes.
Indeed, it were tedious to recount the various
opinions of various disciples.

4. Concerning Plato, the chief among the disciples of Socrates, and his
threefold division of philosophy.

But, among the disciples of Socrates, Plato was the one who
shone with a glory which far excelled that of the others, and
who not unjustly eclipsed them all. By birth an Athenian
of honourable parentage, he far surpassed his fellow-disciples
in natural endowments, of which he was possessed in a wonderful
degree. Yet, deeming himself and the Socratic discipline
far from sufficient for bringing philosophy to perfection, he
travelled as extensively as he was able, going to every place
famed for the cultivation of any science of which he could
make himself master. Thus he learned from the Egyptians
whatever they held and taught as important; and from Egypt,
passing into those parts of Italy which were filled with the
fame of the Pythagoreans, he mastered, with the greatest
facility, and under the most eminent teachers, all the Italic
philosophy which was then in vogue. And, as he had a
peculiar love for his master Socrates, he made him the speaker
in all his dialogues, putting into his mouth whatever he had
learned, either from others, or from the efforts of his own
powerful intellect, tempering even his moral disputations with
the grace and politeness of the Socratic style. And, as the
study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that
one part of it may be called active, and the other contemplative,—the
active part having reference to the conduct of life,
that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part
to the investigation into the causes of nature and into pure
truth,—Socrates is said to have excelled in the active part of
that study, while Pythagoras gave more attention to its contemplative
part, on which he brought to bear all the force of
his great intellect. To Plato is given the praise of having
perfected philosophy by combining both parts into one. He[Pg 311]
then divides it into three parts,—the first moral, which is
chiefly occupied with action; the second natural, of which the
object is contemplation; and the third rational, which discriminates
between the true and the false. And though this
last is necessary both to action and contemplation, it is
contemplation, nevertheless, which lays peculiar claim to the
office of investigating the nature of truth. Thus this tripartite
division is not contrary to that which made the study of
wisdom to consist in action and contemplation. Now, as to
what Plato thought with respect to each of these parts,—that
is, what he believed to be the end of all actions, the cause of
all natures, and the light of all intelligences,—it would be a
question too long to discuss, and about which we ought not
to make any rash affirmation. For, as Plato liked and constantly
affected the well-known method of his master Socrates,
namely, that of dissimulating his knowledge or his opinions,
it is not easy to discover clearly what he himself thought on
various matters, any more than it is to discover what were
the real opinions of Socrates. We must, nevertheless, insert
into our work certain of those opinions which he expresses in
his writings, whether he himself uttered them, or narrates
them as expressed by others, and seems himself to approve
of,—opinions sometimes favourable to the true religion, which
our faith takes up and defends, and sometimes contrary to it,
as, for example, in the questions concerning the existence of
one God or of many, as it relates to the truly blessed life
which is to be after death. For those who are praised as
having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to
all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said
to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding
him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit
that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate
reason for the understanding, and the end in reference
to which the whole life is to be regulated. Of which three
things, the first is understood to pertain to the natural, the
second to the rational, and the third to the moral part of
philosophy. For if man has been so created as to attain,
through that which is most excellent in him, to that which
excels all things,—that is, to the one true and absolutely good[Pg 312]
God, without whom no nature exists, no doctrine instructs, no
exercise profits,—let Him be sought in whom all things are
secure to us, let Him be discovered in whom all truth becomes
certain to us, let Him be loved in whom all becomes right
to us.

5. That it is especially with the Platonists that we must carry on our disputations
on matters of theology, their opinions being preferable to those of all
other philosophers.

If, then, Plato defined the wise man as one who imitates,
knows, loves this God, and who is rendered blessed through
fellowship with Him in His own blessedness, why discuss
with the other philosophers? It is evident that none come
nearer to us than the Platonists. To them, therefore, let that
fabulous theology give place which delights the minds of men
with the crimes of the gods; and that civil theology also, in
which impure demons, under the name of gods, have seduced
the peoples of the earth given up to earthly pleasures, desiring
to be honoured by the errors of men, and, by filling the minds
of their worshippers with impure desires, exciting them to
make the representation of their crimes one of the rites of
their worship, whilst they themselves found in the spectators
of these exhibitions a most pleasing spectacle,—a theology in
which, whatever was honourable in the temple, was defiled by
its mixture with the obscenity of the theatre, and whatever
was base in the theatre was vindicated by the abominations
of the temples. To these philosophers also the interpretations
of Varro must give place, in which he explains the sacred rites
as having reference to heaven and earth, and to the seeds and
operations of perishable things; for, in the first place, those
rites have not the signification which he would have men believe
is attached to them, and therefore truth does not follow
him in his attempt so to interpret them; and even if they
had this signification, still those things ought not to be worshipped
by the rational soul as its god which are placed below
it in the scale of nature, nor ought the soul to prefer to itself
as gods things to which the true God has given it the preference.
The same must be said of those writings pertaining to
the sacred rites, which Numa Pompilius took care to conceal
by causing them to be buried along with himself, and which,[Pg 313]
when they were afterwards turned up by the plough, were
burned by order of the senate. And, to treat Numa with
all honour, let us mention as belonging to the same rank as
these writings that which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his
mother as communicated to him by Leo, an Egyptian high
priest. In this letter not only Picus and Faunus, and Æneas
and Romulus, or even Hercules and Æsculapius and Liber,
born of Semele, and the twin sons of Tyndareus, or any
other mortals who have been deified, but even the principal
gods themselves,[294] to whom Cicero, in his Tusculan questions,[295]
alludes without mentioning their names, Jupiter, Juno,
Saturn, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others whom Varro attempts
to identify with the parts or the elements of the world, are
shown to have been men. There is, as we have said, a similarity
between this case and that of Numa; for, the priest
being afraid because he had revealed a mystery, earnestly
begged of Alexander to command his mother to burn the letter
which conveyed these communications to her. Let these two
theologies, then, the fabulous and the civil, give place to the
Platonic philosophers, who have recognised the true God as
the author of all things, the source of the light of truth, and
the bountiful bestower of all blessedness. And not these only,
but to these great acknowledgers of so great a God, those
philosophers must yield who, having their mind enslaved to
their body, supposed the principles of all things to be material;
as Thales, who held that the first principle of all things was
water; Anaximenes, that it was air; the Stoics, that it was
fire; Epicurus, who affirmed that it consisted of atoms, that
is to say, of minute corpuscules; and many others whom it is
needless to enumerate, but who believed that bodies, simple
or compound, animate or inanimate, but nevertheless bodies,
were the cause and principle of all things. For some of them—as,
for instance, the Epicureans—believed that living things
could originate from things without life; others held that all
things living or without life spring from a living principle,
but that, nevertheless, all things, being material, spring from
a material principle. For the Stoics thought that fire, that
is, one of the four material elements of which this visible[Pg 314]
world is composed, was both living and intelligent, the maker
of the world and of all things contained in it,—that it was
in fact God. These and others like them have only been able
to suppose that which their hearts enslaved to sense have
vainly suggested to them. And yet they have within themselves
something which they could not see: they represented
to themselves inwardly things which they had seen without,
even when they were not seeing them, but only thinking of
them. But this representation in thought is no longer a
body, but only the similitude of a body; and that faculty of
the mind by which this similitude of a body is seen is neither
a body nor the similitude of a body; and the faculty which
judges whether the representation is beautiful or ugly is
without doubt superior to the object judged of. This principle
is the understanding of man, the rational soul; and it is
certainly not a body, since that similitude of a body which it
beholds and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither
earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called
the four elements, we see that this world is composed. And
if the soul is not a body, how should God, its Creator, be a
body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we
have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been
ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that
our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been
staggered by the great changeableness of the soul,—an attribute
which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature,—but
they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in
itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, “Flesh is
wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable.” In a
word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing,
so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly
be said to be immutable.

6. Concerning the meaning of the Platonists in that part of philosophy called
physical.

These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly
exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no
material body is God, and therefore they have transcended
all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever
is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they[Pg 315]
have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in
seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every
changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is,
whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him
who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore,
whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure,
qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies
which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that
which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that
which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts;
or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of
man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment,
but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels,—all
can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him
it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He
could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and
another thing to understand, as though He could live, not
understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand,
another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand
and not be blessed. But to Him to live, to understand, to
be blessed, are to be. They have understood, from this unchangeableness
and this simplicity, that all things must have
been made by Him, and that He could Himself have been
made by none. For they have considered that whatever is
is either body or life, and that life is something better than
body, and that the nature of body is sensible, and that of
life intelligible. Therefore they have preferred the intelligible
nature to the sensible. We mean by sensible things such
things as can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body;
by intelligible things, such as can be understood by the sight
of the mind. For there is no corporeal beauty, whether in
the condition of a body, as figure, or in its movement, as in
music, of which it is not the mind that judges. But this
could never have been, had there not existed in the mind
itself a superior form of these things, without bulk, without
noise of voice, without space and time. But even in respect
of these things, had the mind not been mutable, it would not
have been possible for one to judge better than another with
regard to sensible forms. He who is clever judges better[Pg 316]
than he who is slow, he who is skilled than he who is unskilful,
he who is practised than he who is unpractised; and
the same person judges better after he has gained experience
than he did before. But that which is capable of more and
less is mutable; whence able men, who have thought deeply
on these things, have gathered that the first form is not to
be found in those things whose form is changeable. Since,
therefore, they saw that body and mind might be more or
less beautiful in form, and that, if they wanted form, they
could have no existence, they saw that there is some existence
in which is the first form, unchangeable, and therefore
not admitting of degrees of comparison, and in that they most
rightly believed was the first principle of things, which was
not made, and by which all things were made. Therefore
that which is known of God He manifested to them when
His invisible things were seen by them, being understood
by those things which have been made; also His eternal
power and Godhead by whom all visible and temporal things
have been created.[296] We have said enough upon that part of
theology which they call physical, that is, natural.

7. How much the Platonists are to be held as excelling other philosophers in
logic, i.e. rational philosophy.

Then, again, as far as regards the doctrine which treats of
that which they call logic, that is, rational philosophy, far be
it from us to compare them with those who attributed to
the bodily senses the faculty of discriminating truth, and
thought that all we learn is to be measured by their untrustworthy
and fallacious rules. Such were the Epicureans,
and all of the same school. Such also were the Stoics, who
ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation
which they so ardently love, called by them dialectic, asserting
that from the senses the mind conceives the notions
(ἔννοιαι) of those things which they explicate by definition.
And hence is developed the whole plan and connection of
their learning and teaching. I often wonder, with respect to
this, how they can say that none are beautiful but the wise;
for by what bodily sense have they perceived that beauty,
by what eyes of the flesh have they seen wisdom’s comeliness[Pg 317]
of form? Those, however, whom we justly rank before
all others, have distinguished those things which are conceived
by the mind from those which are perceived by the
senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to
which they are competent, nor attributing to them anything
beyond their competency. And the light of our understandings,
by which all things are learned by us, they have affirmed
to be that selfsame God by whom all things were made.

8. That the Platonists hold the first rank in moral philosophy also.

The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is
called by the Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question
concerning the chief good,—that which will leave us nothing
further to seek in order to be blessed, if only we make all
our actions refer to it, and seek it not for the sake of something
else, but for its own sake. Therefore it is called the
end, because we wish other things on account of it, but itself
only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore, according
to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,
from the mind, and, according to others, from both together.
For they saw that man himself consists of soul and body;
and therefore they believed that from either of these two,
or from both together, their well-being must proceed, consisting
in a certain final good, which could render them blessed,
and to which they might refer all their actions, not requiring
anything ulterior to which to refer that good itself. This is
why those who have added a third kind of good things, which
they call extrinsic,—as honour, glory, wealth, and the like,—have
not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to be
sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be
sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind
of good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore,
whether they have sought the good of man from the
mind or from the body, or from both together, it is still only
from man they have supposed that it must be sought. But
they who have sought it from the body have sought it from
the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from the
mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it
from both, from the whole man. Whether, therefore, they[Pg 318]
have sought it from any part, or from the whole man, still
they have only sought it from man; nor have these differences,
being three, given rise only to three dissentient sects
of philosophers, but to many. For diverse philosophers have
held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of the body,
and the good of the mind, and the good of both together.
Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who
have not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of
the body, or by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment
of God,—enjoying Him, however, not as the mind does
the body or itself, or as one friend enjoys another, but as the
eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we may draw any comparison
between these things. But what the nature of this comparison
is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place, to the
best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention
that Plato determined the final good to be to live according
to virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who
knows and imitates God,—which knowledge and imitation are
the only cause of blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt
that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal.
Whence it certainly follows that the student of
wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then become blessed
when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he is
not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for
many are miserable by loving that which ought not to be
loved, and still more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless
no one is blessed who does not enjoy that which he loves.
For even they who love things which ought not to be loved
do not count themselves blessed by loving merely, but by
enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will deny
that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves
the true and highest good? But the true and highest good,
according to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him
a philosopher who loves God; for philosophy is directed to the
obtaining of the blessed life, and he who loves God is blessed
in the enjoyment of God.

9. Concerning that philosophy which has come nearest to the Christian faith.

Whatever philosophers, therefore, thought concerning the
supreme God, that He is both the maker of all created things,[Pg 319]
the light by which things are known, and the good in reference
to which things are to be done; that we have in Him the
first principle of nature, the truth of doctrine, and the happiness
of life,—whether these philosophers may be more suitably
called Platonists, or whether they may give some other name
to their sect; whether, we say, that only the chief men of the
Ionic school, such as Plato himself, and they who have well
understood him, have thought thus; or whether we also include
the Italic school, on account of Pythagoras and the
Pythagoreans, and all who may have held like opinions; and,
lastly, whether also we include all who have been held wise
men and philosophers among all nations who are discovered to
have seen and taught this, be they Atlantics, Libyans, Egyptians,
Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Scythians, Gauls, Spaniards, or
of other nations,—we prefer these to all other philosophers,
and confess that they approach nearest to us.

10. That the excellency of the Christian religion is above all the science of
philosophers.

For although a Christian man instructed only in ecclesiastical
literature may perhaps be ignorant of the very name of
Platonists, and may not even know that there have existed
two schools of philosophers speaking the Greek tongue, to
wit, the Ionic and Italic, he is nevertheless not so deaf with
respect to human affairs, as not to know that philosophers
profess the study, and even the possession, of wisdom. He
is on his guard, however, with respect to those who philosophize
according to the elements of this world, not according
to God, by whom the world itself was made; for he is warned
by the precept of the apostle, and faithfully hears what has
been said, “Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy
and vain deceit, according to the elements of the world.”[297]
Then, that he may not suppose that all philosophers are such
as do this, he hears the same apostle say concerning certain
of them, “Because that which is known of God is manifest
among them, for God has manifested it to them. For His
invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly
seen, being understood by the things which are made, also[Pg 320]
His eternal power and Godhead.”[298] And, when speaking to
the Athenians, after having spoken a mighty thing concerning
God, which few are able to understand, “In Him we live, and
move, and have our being,”[299] he goes on to say, “As certain
also of your own have said.” He knows well, too, to be on
his guard against even these philosophers in their errors. For
where it has been said by him, “that God has manifested to
them by those things which are made His invisible things, that
they might be seen by the understanding,” there it has also
been said that they did not rightly worship God Himself,
because they paid divine honours, which are due to Him
alone, to other things also to which they ought not to have
paid them,—”because, knowing God, they glorified Him not as
God; neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations,
and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing
themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the
glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image
of corruptible man, and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and
creeping things;”[300]—where the apostle would have us
understand him as meaning the Romans, and Greeks, and
Egyptians, who gloried in the name of wisdom; but concerning
this we will dispute with them afterwards. With
respect, however, to that wherein they agree with us we
prefer them to all others, namely, concerning the one God,
the author of this universe, who is not only above every body,
being incorporeal, but also above all souls, being incorruptible—our
principle, our light, our good. And though the
Christian man, being ignorant of their writings, does not use
in disputation words which he has not learned,—not calling
that part of philosophy natural (which is the Latin term), or
physical (which is the Greek one), which treats of the investigation
of nature; or that part rational, or logical, which deals
with the question how truth may be discovered; or that part
moral, or ethical, which concerns morals, and shows how good
is to be sought, and evil to be shunned,—he is not, therefore,
ignorant that it is from the one true and supremely good God
that we have that nature in which we are made in the image
of God, and that doctrine by which we know Him and ourselves,[Pg 321]
and that grace through which, by cleaving to Him, we
are blessed. This, therefore, is the cause why we prefer these
to all the others, because, whilst other philosophers have worn
out their minds and powers in seeking the causes of things,
and endeavouring to discover the right mode of learning and
of living, these, by knowing God, have found where resides the
cause by which the universe has been constituted, and the
light by which truth is to be discovered, and the fountain at
which felicity is to be drunk. All philosophers, then, who
have had these thoughts concerning God, whether Platonists
or others, agree with us. But we have thought it better to
plead our cause with the Platonists, because their writings are
better known. For the Greeks, whose tongue holds the highest
place among the languages of the Gentiles, are loud in their
praises of these writings; and the Latins, taken with their
excellence, or their renown, have studied them more heartily
than other writings, and, by translating them into our tongue,
have given them greater celebrity and notoriety.

11. How Plato has been able to approach so nearly to Christian knowledge.

Certain partakers with us in the grace of Christ, wonder
when they hear and read that Plato had conceptions concerning
God, in which they recognise considerable agreement with
the truth of our religion. Some have concluded from this,
that when he went to Egypt he had heard the prophet Jeremiah,
or, whilst travelling in the same country, had read the
prophetic scriptures, which opinion I myself have expressed
in certain of my writings.[301] But a careful calculation of dates,
contained in chronological history, shows that Plato was born
about a hundred years after the time in which Jeremiah prophesied,
and, as he lived eighty-one years, there are found to
have been about seventy years from his death to that time
when Ptolemy, king of Egypt, requested the prophetic scriptures
of the Hebrew people to be sent to him from Judea,
and committed them to seventy Hebrews, who also knew the
Greek tongue, to be translated and kept. Therefore, on that
voyage of his, Plato could neither have seen Jeremiah, who
was dead so long before, nor have read those same scriptures[Pg 322]
which had not yet been translated into the Greek language, of
which he was a master, unless, indeed, we say that, as he
was most earnest in the pursuit of knowledge, he also studied
those writings through an interpreter, as he did those of the
Egyptians,—not, indeed, writing a translation of them (the
facilities for doing which were only gained even by Ptolemy
in return for munificent acts of kindness,[302] though fear of his
kingly authority might have seemed a sufficient motive), but
learning as much as he possibly could concerning their contents
by means of conversation. What warrants this supposition is
the opening verses of Genesis: “In the beginning God made
the heaven and earth. And the earth was invisible, and
without order; and darkness was over the abyss: and the
Spirit of God moved over the waters.”[303] For in the Timæus,
when writing on the formation of the world, he says that God
first united earth and fire; from which it is evident that he
assigns to fire a place in heaven. This opinion bears a certain
resemblance to the statement, “In the beginning God made
heaven and earth.” Plato next speaks of those two intermediary
elements, water and air, by which the other two
extremes, namely, earth and fire, were mutually united;
from which circumstance he is thought to have so understood
the words, “The Spirit of God moved over the waters.” For,
not paying sufficient attention to the designations given by
those scriptures to the Spirit of God, he may have thought
that the four elements are spoken of in that place, because
the air also is called spirit.[304] Then, as to Plato’s saying that
the philosopher is a lover of God, nothing shines forth more
conspicuously in those sacred writings. But the most striking
thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines
me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant
of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question
elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God
were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what
was the name of that God who was commanding him to go
and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was[Pg 323]
given: “I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of
Israel, He who is sent me unto you;”[305] as though compared
with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those
things which have been created mutable are not,—a truth
which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently commended.
And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be
found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in
that book where it is said, “I am who am; and thou shalt
say to the children of Israel, Who is sent me unto you.”

12. That even the Platonists, though they say these things concerning the one
true God, nevertheless thought that sacred rites were to be performed in
honour of many gods.

But we need not determine from what source he learned
these things,—whether it was from the books of the ancients
who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of
the apostle: “Because that which is known of God has been
manifested among them, for God hath manifested it to them.
For His invisible things from the creation of the world are
clearly seen, being understood by those things which have
been made, also His eternal power and Godhead.”[306] From
whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I
think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen
the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with
whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken
up concerns the natural theology,—the question, namely,
whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to
many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death.
I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts
concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have
made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given
them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity,
that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of
eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior
to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect,—so
called because they were in the habit of walking about during
their disputations,—and though he had, through the greatness
of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even
during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death[Pg 324]
was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy,
by Speusippus, his sister’s son, and Xenocrates, his beloved
disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from
this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most
illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato,
have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics,
but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these
were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who
were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both
in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the
rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself,
thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honour of
many gods.

13. Concerning the opinion of Plato, according to which he defined the gods
as beings entirely good and the friends of virtue.

Therefore, although in many other important respects they
differ from us, nevertheless with respect to this particular
point of difference, which I have just stated, as it is one of
great moment, and the question on hand concerns it, I will
first ask them to what gods they think that sacred rites are
to be performed,—to the good or to the bad, or to both the
good and the bad? But we have the opinion of Plato affirming
that all the gods are good, and that there is not one of the
gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be performed
to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if they
are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case
(for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly
it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be
propitiated by sacred rites in order that they may not harm
us, but the good gods are to be invoked in order that they
may assist us. For there are no bad gods, and it is to the
good that, as they say, the due honour of such rites is to
be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who love
scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them
among divine things, and that they be exhibited in their
honour? The power of these gods proves that they exist,
but their liking such things proves that they are bad. For it
is well known what Plato’s opinion was concerning scenic
plays. He thinks that the poets themselves, because they[Pg 325]
have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and goodness
of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of
what character, therefore, are those gods who contend with
Plato himself about those scenic plays? He does not suffer
the gods to be defamed by false crimes; the gods command
those same crimes to be celebrated in their own honour.

In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated,
they not only demanded base things, but also did cruel things,
taking from Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease
upon him because he had refused to obey them, which they
removed when he had fulfilled their commands. Plato, however,
bad though they were, did not think they were to be
feared; but, holding to his opinion with the utmost firmness
and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a well-ordered
state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with
which these gods are delighted because they themselves are
impure. But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned
already in the second book[307]) among the demi-gods.
Now Labeo thinks that the bad deities are to be propitiated
with bloody victims, and by fasts accompanied with the same,
but the good deities with plays, and all other things which
are associated with joyfulness. How comes it, then, that the
demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away those pleasures,
because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods
but from the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover,
those very gods themselves do certainly refute the opinion of
Labeo, for they showed themselves in the case of Latinius to
be not only wanton and sportive, but also cruel and terrible.
Let the Platonists, therefore, explain these things to us, since,
following the opinion of their master, they think that all the
gods are good and honourable, and friendly to the virtues of
the wise, holding it unlawful to think otherwise concerning
any of the gods. We will explain it, say they. Let us then
attentively listen to them.

14. Of the opinion of those who have said that rational souls are of three kinds,
to wit, those of the celestial gods, those of the aerial demons, and those of
terrestrial men.

There is, say they, a threefold division of all animals endowed[Pg 326]
with a rational soul, namely, into gods, men, and demons.
The gods occupy the loftiest region, men the lowest, the
demons the middle region. For the abode of the gods is
heaven, that of men the earth, that of the demons the air.
As the dignity of their regions is diverse, so also is that of
their natures; therefore the gods are better than men and
demons. Men have been placed below the gods and demons,
both in respect of the order of the regions they inhabit, and
the difference of their merits. The demons, therefore, who
hold the middle place, as they are inferior to the gods, than
whom they inhabit a lower region, so they are superior to
men, than whom they inhabit a loftier one. For they have
immortality of body in common with the gods, but passions of
the mind in common with men. On which account, say they,
it is not wonderful that they are delighted with the obscenities
of the theatre, and the fictions of the poets, since they are
also subject to human passions, from which the gods are far
removed, and to which they are altogether strangers. Whence
we conclude that it was not the gods, who are all good and
highly exalted, that Plato deprived of the pleasure of theatric
plays, by reprobating and prohibiting the fictions of the poets,
but the demons.

Of these things many have written: among others Apuleius,
the Platonist of Madaura, who composed a whole work on the
subject, entitled, Concerning the God of Socrates. He there
discusses and explains of what kind that deity was who attended
on Socrates, a sort of familiar, by whom it is said he
was admonished to desist from any action which would not
turn out to his advantage. He asserts most distinctly, and
proves at great length, that it was not a god but a demon;
and he discusses with great diligence the opinion of Plato
concerning the lofty estate of the gods, the lowly estate of men,
and the middle estate of demons. These things being so,
how did Plato dare to take away, if not from the gods, whom
he removed from all human contagion, certainly from the
demons, all the pleasures of the theatre, by expelling the poets
from the state? Evidently in this way he wished to admonish
the human soul, although still confined in these moribund
members, to despise the shameful commands of the demons,[Pg 327]
and to detest their impurity, and to choose rather the splendour
of virtue. But if Plato showed himself virtuous in
answering and prohibiting these things, then certainly it was
shameful of the demons to command them. Therefore either
Apuleius is wrong, and Socrates’ familiar did not belong to
this class of deities, or Plato held contradictory opinions, now
honouring the demons, now removing from the well-regulated
state the things in which they delighted, or Socrates is not to
be congratulated on the friendship of the demon, of which
Apuleius was so ashamed that he entitled his book On the
God of Socrates, whilst according to the tenor of his discussion,
wherein he so diligently and at such length distinguishes
gods from demons, he ought not to have entitled it, Concerning
the God, but Concerning the Demon of Socrates. But he
preferred to put this into the discussion itself rather than into
the title of his book. For, through the sound doctrine which
has illuminated human society, all, or almost all men have
such a horror at the name of demons, that every one who,
before reading the dissertation of Apuleius, which sets forth
the dignity of demons, should have read the title of the book,
On the Demon of Socrates, would certainly have thought that
the author was not a sane man. But what did even Apuleius
find to praise in the demons, except subtlety and strength of
body and a higher place of habitation? For when he spoke
generally concerning their manners, he said nothing that was
good, but very much that was bad. Finally, no one, when he
has read that book, wonders that they desired to have even
the obscenity of the stage among divine things, or that, wishing
to be thought gods, they should be delighted with the
crimes of the gods, or that all those sacred solemnities, whose
obscenity occasions laughter, and whose shameful cruelty causes
horror, should be in agreement with their passions.

15. That the demons are not better than men because of their aerial bodies,
or on account of their superior place of abode.

Wherefore let not the mind truly religious, and submitted
to the true God, suppose that demons are better than men,
because they have better bodies. Otherwise it must put
many beasts before itself which are superior to us both in
acuteness of the senses, in ease and quickness of movement,[Pg 328]
in strength and in long-continued vigour of body. What
man can equal the eagle or the vulture in strength of vision?
Who can equal the dog in acuteness of smell? Who can
equal the hare, the stag, and all the birds in swiftness? Who
can equal in strength the lion or the elephant? Who can
equal in length of life the serpents, which are affirmed to
put off old age along with their skin, and to return to youth
again? But as we are better than all these by the possession
of reason and understanding, so we ought also to be better
than the demons by living good and virtuous lives. For
divine providence gave to them bodies of a better quality
than ours, that that in which we excel them might in this
way be commended to us as deserving to be far more cared
for than the body, and that we should learn to despise the
bodily excellence of the demons compared with goodness of
life, in respect of which we are better than they, knowing that
we too shall have immortality of body,—not an immortality
tortured by eternal punishment, but that which is consequent
on purity of soul.

But now, as regards loftiness of place, it is altogether ridiculous
to be so influenced by the fact that the demons inhabit
the air, and we the earth, as to think that on that account
they are to be put before us; for in this way we put all the
birds before ourselves. But the birds, when they are weary
with flying, or require to repair their bodies with food, come
back to the earth to rest or to feed, which the demons, they
say, do not. Are they, therefore, inclined to say that the
birds are superior to us, and the demons superior to the birds?
But if it be madness to think so, there is no reason why we
should think that, on account of their inhabiting a loftier
element, the demons have a claim to our religious submission.
But as it is really the case that the birds of the air are not
only not put before us who dwell on the earth, but are even
subjected to us on account of the dignity of the rational soul
which is in us, so also it is the case that the demons, though
they are aerial, are not better than we who are terrestrial
because the air is higher than the earth, but, on the contrary,
men are to be put before demons because their despair is not
to be compared to the hope of pious men. Even that law of[Pg 329]
Plato’s, according to which he mutually orders and arranges
the four elements, inserting between the two extreme elements—namely,
fire, which is in the highest degree mobile, and the
immoveable earth—the two middle ones, air and water, that
by how much the air is higher up than the water, and the fire
than the air, by so much also are the waters higher than
the earth,—this law, I say, sufficiently admonishes us not to
estimate the merits of animated creatures according to the
grades of the elements. And Apuleius himself says that man
is a terrestrial animal in common with the rest, who is nevertheless
to be put far before aquatic animals, though Plato puts
the waters themselves before the land. By this he would
have us understand that the same order is not to be observed
when the question concerns the merits of animals, though it
seems to be the true one in the gradation of bodies; for it
appears to be possible that a soul of a higher order may inhabit
a body of a lower, and a soul of a lower order a body
of a higher.

16. What Apuleius the Platonist thought concerning the manners and
actions of demons.

The same Apuleius, when speaking concerning the manners
of demons, said that they are agitated with the same perturbations
of mind as men; that they are provoked by injuries,
propitiated by services and by gifts, rejoice in honours, are
delighted with a variety of sacred rites, and are annoyed if
any of them be neglected. Among other things, he also says
that on them depend the divinations of augurs, soothsayers,
and prophets, and the revelations of dreams; and that from
them also are the miracles of the magicians. But, when
giving a brief definition of them, he says, “Demons are of an
animal nature, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body,
eternal in time.” “Of which five things, the three first are
common to them and us, the fourth peculiar to themselves,
and the fifth common to them with the gods.”[308] But I see
that they have in common with the gods two of the first things,
which they have in common with us. For he says that the
gods also are animals; and when he is assigning to every
order of beings its own element, he places us among the other[Pg 330]
terrestrial animals which live and feel upon the earth. Wherefore,
if the demons are animals as to genus, this is common to
them, not only with men, but also with the gods and with
beasts; if they are rational as to their mind, this is common
to them with the gods and with men; if they are eternal in
time, this is common to them with the gods only; if they are
passive as to their soul, this is common to them with men
only; if they are aerial in body, in this they are alone. Therefore
it is no great thing for them to be of an animal nature,
for so also are the beasts; in being rational as to mind, they
are not above ourselves, for so are we also; and as to their
being eternal as to time, what is the advantage of that if
they are not blessed? for better is temporal happiness than
eternal misery. Again, as to their being passive in soul, how
are they in this respect above us, since we also are so, but
would not have been so had we not been miserable? Also,
as to their being aerial in body, how much value is to be set
on that, since a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be set above
every body? and therefore religious worship, which ought to
be rendered from the soul, is by no means due to that thing
which is inferior to the soul. Moreover, if he had, among
those things which he says belong to demons, enumerated
virtue, wisdom, happiness, and affirmed that they have those
things in common with the gods, and, like them, eternally, he
would assuredly have attributed to them something greatly to
be desired, and much to be prized. And even in that case it
would not have been our duty to worship them like God on
account of these things, but rather to worship Him from whom
we know they had received them. But how much less are
they really worthy of divine honour,—those aerial animals who
are only rational that they may be capable of misery, passive
that they may be actually miserable, and eternal that it may
be impossible for them to end their misery!

17. Whether it is proper that men should worship those spirits from whose
vices it is necessary that they be freed.

Wherefore, to omit other things, and confine our attention
to that which he says is common to the demons with us, let us
ask this question: If all the four elements are full of their own
animals, the fire and the air of immortal, and the water and the[Pg 331]
earth of mortal ones, why are the souls of demons agitated by
the whirlwinds and tempests of passions?—for the Greek word
πάθος means perturbation, whence he chose to call the demons
“passive in soul,” because the word passion, which is derived
from πάθος, signified a commotion of the mind contrary to
reason. Why, then, are these things in the minds of demons
which are not in beasts? For if anything of this kind appears
in beasts, it is not perturbation, because it is not contrary to
reason, of which they are devoid. Now it is foolishness or
misery which is the cause of these perturbations in the case of
men, for we are not yet blessed in the possession of that perfection
of wisdom which is promised to us at last, when we
shall be set free from our present mortality. But the gods,
they say, are free from these perturbations, because they are
not only eternal, but also blessed; for they also have the same
kind of rational souls, but most pure from all spot and plague.
Wherefore, if the gods are free from perturbation because they
are blessed, not miserable animals, and the beasts are free
from them because they are animals which are capable neither
of blessedness nor misery, it remains that the demons, like
men, are subject to perturbations because they are not blessed
but miserable animals. What folly, therefore, or rather what
madness, to submit ourselves through any sentiment of religion
to demons, when it belongs to the true religion to deliver us
from that depravity which makes us like to them! For
Apuleius himself, although he is very sparing toward them,
and thinks they are worthy of divine honours, is nevertheless
compelled to confess that they are subject to anger; and the
true religion commands us not to be moved with anger, but
rather to resist it. The demons are won over by gifts; and
the true religion commands us to favour no one on account of
gifts received. The demons are flattered by honours; but the
true religion commands us by no means to be moved by such
things. The demons are haters of some men and lovers of
others, not in consequence of a prudent and calm judgment,
but because of what he calls their “passive soul;” whereas the
true religion commands us to love even our enemies. Lastly,
the true religion commands us to put away all disquietude
of heart, and agitation of mind, and also all commotions and[Pg 332]
tempests of the soul, which Apuleius asserts to be continually
swelling and surging in the souls of demons. Why, therefore,
except through foolishness and miserable error, shouldst thou
humble thyself to worship a being to whom thou desirest to
be unlike in thy life? And why shouldst thou pay religious
homage to him whom thou art unwilling to imitate, when it
is the highest duty of religion to imitate Him whom thou worshippest?

18. What kind of religion that is which teaches that men ought to employ the
advocacy of demons in order to be recommended to the favour of the good
gods.

In vain, therefore, have Apuleius, and they who think with
him, conferred on the demons the honour of placing them in
the air, between the ethereal heavens and the earth, that they
may carry to the gods the prayers of men, to men the answers of
the gods; for Plato held, they say, that no god has intercourse
with man. They who believe these things have thought it unbecoming
that men should have intercourse with the gods, and
the gods with men, but a befitting thing that the demons
should have intercourse with both gods and men, presenting to
the gods the petitions of men, and conveying to men what the
gods have granted; so that a chaste man, and one who is a
stranger to the crimes of the magic arts, must use as patrons,
through whom the gods may be induced to hear him, demons
who love these crimes, although the very fact of his not loving
them ought to have recommended him to them as one who
deserved to be listened to with greater readiness and willingness
on their part. They love the abominations of the stage,
which chastity does not love. They love, in the sorceries of
the magicians, “a thousand arts of inflicting harm,”[309] which innocence
does not love. Yet both chastity and innocence, if
they wish to obtain anything from the gods, will not be able
to do so by their own merits, except their enemies act as
mediators on their behalf. Apuleius need not attempt to
justify the fictions of the poets, and the mockeries of the stage.
If human modesty can act so faithlessly towards itself as not
only to love shameful things, but even to think that they are[Pg 333]
pleasing to the divinity, we can cite on the other side their
own highest authority and teacher, Plato.

19. Of the impiety of the magic art, which is dependent on the assistance
of malign spirits.

Moreover, against those magic arts, concerning which some
men, exceedingly wretched and exceedingly impious, delight
to boast, may not public opinion itself be brought forward as
a witness? For why are those arts so severely punished by
the laws, if they are the works of deities who ought to be
worshipped? Shall it be said that the Christians have ordained
those laws by which magic arts are punished? With what
other meaning, except that these sorceries are without doubt
pernicious to the human race, did the most illustrious poet
say,

“By heaven, I swear, and your dear life,

Unwillingly these arms I wield,

And take, to meet the coming strife,

Enchantment’s sword and shield.”[310]

And that also which he says in another place concerning
magic arts,

“I’ve seen him to another place transport the standing corn,”[311]

has reference to the fact that the fruits of one field are said to
be transferred to another by these arts which this pestiferous
and accursed doctrine teaches. Does not Cicero inform us that,
among the laws of the Twelve Tables, that is, the most ancient
laws of the Romans, there was a law written which appointed
a punishment to be inflicted on him who should do this?[312]
Lastly, was it before Christian judges that Apuleius himself
was accused of magic arts?[313] Had he known these arts to be
divine and pious, and congruous with the works of divine
power, he ought not only to have confessed, but also to have
professed them, rather blaming the laws by which these things
were prohibited and pronounced worthy of condemnation, while
they ought to have been held worthy of admiration and respect.[Pg 334]
For by so doing, either he would have persuaded the judges to
adopt his own opinion, or, if they had shown their partiality
for unjust laws, and condemned him to death notwithstanding
his praising and commending such things, the demons would
have bestowed on his soul such rewards as he deserved, who,
in order to proclaim and set forth their divine works, had not
feared the loss of his human life. As our martyrs, when that
religion was charged on them as a crime, by which they knew
they were made safe and most glorious throughout eternity,
did not choose, by denying it, to escape temporal punishments,
but rather by confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by
enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by
dying for it with pious calmness, put to shame the law by
which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation.
But there is extant a most copious and eloquent oration of
this Platonic philosopher, in which he defends himself against
the charge of practising these arts, affirming that he is wholly
a stranger to them, and only wishing to show his innocence
by denying such things as cannot be innocently committed.
But all the miracles of the magicians, who he thinks are justly
deserving of condemnation, are performed according to the
teaching and by the power of demons. Why, then, does he
think that they ought to be honoured? For he asserts that
they are necessary, in order to present our prayers to the gods,
and yet their works are such as we must shun if we wish our
prayers to reach the true God. Again, I ask, what kind of
prayers of men does he suppose are presented to the good
gods by the demons? If magical prayers, they will have none
such; if lawful prayers, they will not receive them through
such beings. But if a sinner who is penitent pour out prayers,
especially if he has committed any crime of sorcery, does he
receive pardon through the intercession of those demons by
whose instigation and help he has fallen into the sin he mourns?
or do the demons themselves, in order that they may merit
pardon for the penitent, first become penitents because they
have deceived them? This no one ever said concerning the
demons; for had this been the case, they would never have
dared to seek for themselves divine honours. For how should
they do so who desired by penitence to obtain the grace of[Pg 335]
pardon, seeing that such detestable pride could not exist along
with a humility worthy of pardon?

20. Whether we are to believe that the good gods are more willing to have
intercourse with demons than with men.

But does any urgent and most pressing cause compel the
demons to mediate between the gods and men, that they may
offer the prayers of men, and bring back the answers from the
gods? and if so, what, pray, is that cause, what is that so
great necessity? Because, say they, no god has intercourse
with man. Most admirable holiness of God, which has no
intercourse with a supplicating man, and yet has intercourse
with an arrogant demon! which has no intercourse with a
penitent man, and yet has intercourse with a deceiving demon!
which has no intercourse with a man fleeing for refuge to the
divine nature, and yet has intercourse with a demon feigning
divinity! which has no intercourse with a man seeking pardon,
and yet has intercourse with a demon persuading to wickedness!
which has no intercourse with a man expelling the
poets by means of philosophical writings from a well-regulated
state, and yet has intercourse with a demon requesting
from the princes and priests of a state the theatrical performance
of the mockeries of the poets! which has no intercourse
with the man who prohibits the ascribing of crime to the
gods, and yet has intercourse with a demon who takes delight
in the fictitious representation of their crimes! which has no
intercourse with a man punishing the crimes of the magicians
by just laws, and yet has intercourse with a demon teaching
and practising magical arts! which has no intercourse with a
man shunning the imitation of a demon, and yet has intercourse
with a demon lying in wait for the deception of a
man!

21. Whether the gods use the demons as messengers and interpreters, and whether
they are deceived by them willingly, or without their own knowledge.

But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this
absurdity, so unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods,
who are concerned about human affairs, would not know what
terrestrial men were doing unless the aerial demons should
bring them intelligence, because the ether is suspended far
away from the earth and far above it, but the air is contiguous[Pg 336]
both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom!
what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they
say, are all in the highest degree good, but that they are
concerned about human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy
of worship, whilst, on the other hand, from the
distance between the elements, they are ignorant of terrestrial
things? It is on this account that they have supposed
the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the
gods may inform themselves with respect to human affairs,
and through whom, when necessary, they may succour men;
and it is on account of this office that the demons themselves
have been held as deserving of worship. If this be the case,
then a demon is better known by these good gods through
nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of mind. O
mournful necessity! or shall I not rather say detestable and
vain error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature!
For if the gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance
of bodies, see our mind, they do not need the demons as
messengers from our mind to them; but if the ethereal gods,
by means of their bodies, perceive the corporeal indices of
minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and thence understand
what the demons tell them, then it is also possible that
they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover,
if the divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons,
neither can it be ignorant of our actions. But I would they
would tell me whether the demons have informed the gods
that the fictions of the poets concerning the crimes of the
gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which they themselves
take in them; or whether they have concealed both, and
have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect
to this whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious
prudence of Plato with respect to the gods as their own lust,
which is injurious to the gods; or whether they have concealed
Plato’s opinion, according to which he was unwilling that the
gods should be defamed with falsely alleged crimes through
the impious licence of the poets, whilst they have not been
ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness,
which make them love theatrical plays, in which the infamous
deeds of the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which[Pg 337]
they will of these four alternatives, and let them consider how
much evil any one of them would require them to think of the
gods. For if they choose the first, they must then confess that
it was not possible for the good gods to dwell with the good
Plato, though he sought to prohibit things injurious to them,
whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted in their
injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods
can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from
them, through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could
know on account of their nearness to themselves.[314] If they
shall choose the second, and shall say that both these things
are concealed by the demons, so that the gods are wholly
ignorant both of Plato’s most religious law and the sacrilegious
pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can the
gods know to any profit with respect to human affairs through
these mediating demons, when they do not know those things
which are decreed, through the piety of good men, for the
honour of the good gods against the lust of evil demons?
But if they shall choose the third, and reply that these intermediary
demons have communicated, not only the opinion
of Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to the gods,
but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if
such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the
gods, hearing both and knowing both, not only permit the
approach of those malign demons, who desire and do things
contrary to the dignity of the gods and the religion of Plato,
but also, through these wicked demons, who are near to them,
send good things to the good Plato, who is far away from
them; for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated
series of the elements, that they can come into contact with
those by whom they are accused, but not with him by whom
they are defended,—knowing the truth on both sides, but not
being able to change the weight of the air and the earth.
There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse than the
rest. For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have
made known the calumnious fictions of the poets concerning
the immortal gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries of the
theatres, and their own most ardent lust after, and most sweet[Pg 338]
pleasure in these things, whilst they have concealed from
them that Plato, with the gravity of a philosopher, gave it as
his opinion that all these things ought to be removed from a
well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are now compelled,
through such messengers, to know the evil doings of
the most wicked beings, that is to say, of the messengers
themselves, and are not allowed to know the good deeds of
the philosophers, though the former are for the injury, but
these latter for the honour of the gods themselves?

22. That we must, notwithstanding the opinion of Apuleius, reject the worship
of demons.

None of these four alternatives, then, is to be chosen; for
we dare not suppose such unbecoming things concerning the
gods as the adoption of any one of them would lead us to
think. It remains, therefore, that no credence whatever is to
be given to the opinion of Apuleius and the other philosophers
of the same school, namely, that the demons act as messengers
and interpreters between the gods and men to carry our petitions
from us to the gods, and to bring back to us the help of
the gods. On the contrary, we must believe them to be spirits
most eager to inflict harm, utterly alien from righteousness,
swollen with pride, pale with envy, subtle in deceit; who dwell
indeed in this air as in a prison, in keeping with their own
character, because, cast down from the height of the higher
heaven, they have been condemned to dwell in this element
as the just reward of irretrievable transgression. But, though
the air is situated above the earth and the waters, they are
not on that account superior in merit to men, who, though
they do not surpass them as far as their earthly bodies are
concerned, do nevertheless far excel them through piety of
mind,—they having made choice of the true God as their
helper. Over many, however, who are manifestly unworthy of
participation in the true religion, they tyrannize as over captives
whom they have subdued,—the greatest part of whom
they have persuaded of their divinity by wonderful and lying
signs, consisting either of deeds or of predictions. Some,
nevertheless, who have more attentively and diligently considered
their vices, they have not been able to persuade that
they are gods, and so have feigned themselves to be messengers[Pg 339]
between the gods and men. Some, indeed, have thought that
not even this latter honour ought to be acknowledged as
belonging to them, not believing that they were gods, because
they saw that they were wicked, whereas the gods, according
to their view, are all good. Nevertheless they dared not say
that they were wholly unworthy of all divine honour, for
fear of offending the multitude, by whom, through inveterate
superstition, the demons were served by the performance of
many rites, and the erection of many temples.

23. What Hermes Trismegistus thought concerning idolatry, and from what
source he knew that the superstitions of Egypt were to be abolished.

The Egyptian Hermes, whom they call Trismegistus, had
a different opinion concerning those demons. Apuleius,
indeed, denies that they are gods; but when he says that
they hold a middle place between the gods and men, so that
they seem to be necessary for men as mediators between them
and the gods, he does not distinguish between the worship
due to them and the religious homage due to the supernal
gods. This Egyptian, however, says that there are some gods
made by the supreme God, and some made by men. Any
one who hears this, as I have stated it, no doubt supposes
that it has reference to images, because they are the works
of the hands of men; but he asserts that visible and tangible
images are, as it were, only the bodies of the gods, and that
there dwell in them certain spirits, which have been invited
to come into them, and which have power to inflict harm, or
to fulfil the desires of those by whom divine honours and
services are rendered to them. To unite, therefore, by a
certain art, those invisible spirits to visible and material
things, so as to make, as it were, animated bodies, dedicated
and given up to those spirits who inhabit them,—this,
he says, is to make gods, adding that men have received
this great and wonderful power. I will give the
words of this Egyptian as they have been translated into
our tongue: “And, since we have undertaken to discourse
concerning the relationship and fellowship between men
and the gods, know, O Æsculapius, the power and strength
of man. As the Lord and Father, or that which is highest,
even God, is the maker of the celestial gods, so man is the[Pg 340]
maker of the gods who are in the temples, content to dwell
near to men.”[315] And a little after he says, “Thus humanity,
always mindful of its nature and origin, perseveres in the
imitation of divinity; and as the Lord and Father made
eternal gods, that they should be like Himself, so humanity
fashioned its own gods according to the likeness of its own
countenance.” When this Æsculapius, to whom especially
he was speaking, had answered him, and had said, “Dost thou
mean the statues, O Trismegistus?”—”Yes, the statues,” replied
he, “however unbelieving thou art, O Æsculapius,—the statues,
animated, and full of sensation and spirit, and who do such
great and wonderful things,—the statues, prescient of future
things, and foretelling them by lot, by prophet, by dreams, and
many other things, who bring diseases on men and cure
them again, giving them joy or sorrow according to their
merits. Dost thou not know, Æsculapius, that Egypt is an
image of heaven, or, more truly, a translation and descent of all
things which are ordered and transacted there,—that it is, in
truth, if we may say so, to be the temple of the whole world?
And yet, as it becomes the prudent man to know all things
beforehand, ye ought not to be ignorant of this, that there is
a time coming when it shall appear that the Egyptians have
all in vain, with pious mind, and with most scrupulous diligence,
waited on the divinity, and when all their holy worship
shall come to nought, and be found to be in vain.”

Hermes then follows out at great length the statements of
this passage, in which he seems to predict the present time, in
which the Christian religion is overthrowing all lying figments
with a vehemence and liberty proportioned to its superior truth
and holiness, in order that the grace of the true Saviour may
deliver men from those gods which man has made, and subject
them to that God by whom man was made. But when
Hermes predicts these things, he speaks as one who is a
friend to these same mockeries of demons, and does not
clearly express the name of Christ. On the contrary, he
deplores, as if it had already taken place, the future abolition
of those things by the observance of which there was maintained[Pg 341]
in Egypt a resemblance of heaven,—he bears witness to
Christianity by a kind of mournful prophecy. Now it was
with reference to such that the apostle said, that “knowing
God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful,
but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart
was darkened; professing themselves to be wise, they became
fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the
likeness of the image of corruptible man,”[316] and so on, for the
whole passage is too long to quote. For Hermes makes many
such statements agreeable to the truth concerning the one
true God who fashioned this world. And I know not how
he has become so bewildered by that “darkening of the heart”
as to stumble into the expression of a desire that men should
always continue in subjection to those gods which he confesses
to be made by men, and to bewail their future removal;
as if there could be anything more wretched than mankind
tyrannized over by the work of his own hands, since man,
by worshipping the works of his own hands, may more easily
cease to be man, than the works of his hands can, through his
worship of them, become gods. For it can sooner happen
that man, who has received an honourable position, may,
through lack of understanding, become comparable to the
beasts, than that the works of man may become preferable to
the work of God, made in His own image, that is, to man
himself. Wherefore deservedly is man left to fall away from
Him who made him, when he prefers to himself that which
he himself has made.

For these vain, deceitful, pernicious, sacrilegious things did
the Egyptian Hermes sorrow, because he knew that the time
was coming when they should be removed. But his sorrow
was as impudently expressed as his knowledge was imprudently
obtained; for it was not the Holy Spirit who revealed these
things to him, as He had done to the holy prophets, who, foreseeing
these things, said with exultation, “If a man shall make
gods, lo, they are no gods;”[317] and in another place, “And it shall
come to pass in that day, saith the Lord, that I will cut off
the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more
be remembered.”[318] But the holy Isaiah prophesies expressly[Pg 342]
concerning Egypt in reference to this matter, saying, “And the
idols of Egypt shall be moved at His presence, and their heart
shall be overcome in them,”[319] and other things to the same effect.
And with the prophet are to be classed those who rejoiced that
that which they knew was to come had actually come,—as
Simeon, or Anna, who immediately recognised Jesus when He
was born, or Elisabeth, who in the Spirit recognised Him
when He was conceived, or Peter, who said by the revelation
of the Father, “Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God.”[320]
But to this Egyptian those spirits indicated the time of their
own destruction, who also, when the Lord was present in the
flesh, said with trembling, “Art Thou come hither to destroy
us before the time?”[321] meaning by destruction before the time,
either that very destruction which they expected to come,
but which they did not think would come so suddenly as it
appeared to have done, or only that destruction which consisted
in their being brought into contempt by being made
known. And, indeed, this was a destruction before the time,
that is, before the time of judgment, when they are to be
punished with eternal damnation, together with all men who
are implicated in their wickedness, as the true religion declares,
which neither errs nor leads into error; for it is not
like him who, blown hither and thither by every wind of
doctrine, and mixing true things with things which are false,
bewails as about to perish a religion which he afterwards
confesses to be error.

24. How Hermes openly confessed the error of his forefathers, the coming
destruction of which he nevertheless bewailed.

After a long interval, Hermes again comes back to the
subject of the gods which men have made, saying as follows:
“But enough on this subject. Let us return to man and to
reason, that divine gift on account of which man has been
called a rational animal. For the things which have been
said concerning man, wonderful though they are, are less
wonderful than those which have been said concerning reason.
For man to discover the divine nature, and to make it, surpasses
the wonder of all other wonderful things. Because,
therefore, our forefathers erred very far with respect to the[Pg 343]
knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want
of attention to their worship and service, they invented this
art of making gods; and this art once invented, they associated
with it a suitable virtue borrowed from universal nature, and,
being incapable of making souls, they evoked those of demons
or of angels, and united them with these holy images and
divine mysteries, in order that through these souls the images
might have power to do good or harm to men.” I know not
whether the demons themselves could have been made, even
by adjuration, to confess as he has confessed in these words:
“Because our forefathers erred very far with respect to the
knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and through want
of attention to their worship and service, they invented the
art of making gods.” Does he say that it was a moderate
degree of error which resulted in their discovery of the art
of making gods, or was he content to say “they erred?” No;
he must needs add “very far,” and say, “They erred very far.”
It was this great error and incredulity, then, of their forefathers
who did not attend to the worship and service of the
gods, which was the origin of the art of making gods. And
yet this wise man grieves over the ruin of this art at some
future time, as if it were a divine religion. Is he not verily
compelled by divine influence, on the one hand, to reveal the
past error of his forefathers, and by a diabolical influence, on
the other hand, to bewail the future punishment of demons?
For if their forefathers, by erring very far with respect to
the knowledge of the gods, through incredulity and aversion
of mind from their worship and service, invented the art of
making gods, what wonder is it that all that is done by this
detestable art, which is opposed to the divine religion, should
be taken away by that religion, when truth corrects error,
faith refutes incredulity, and conversion rectifies aversion?

For if he had only said, without mentioning the cause, that
his forefathers had discovered the art of making gods, it would
have been our duty, if we paid any regard to what is right
and pious, to consider and to see that they could never have
attained to this art if they had not erred from the truth, if
they had believed those things which are worthy of God, if
they had attended to divine worship and service. However,[Pg 344]
if we alone should say that the causes of this art were to be
found in the great error and incredulity of men, and aversion
of the mind erring from and unfaithful to divine religion, the
impudence of those who resist the truth were in some way
to be borne with; but when he who admires in man, above
all other things, this power which it has been granted him to
practise, and sorrows because a time is coming when all those
figments of gods invented by men shall even be commanded
by the laws to be taken away,—when even this man confesses
nevertheless, and explains the causes which led to the
discovery of this art, saying that their ancestors, through great
error and incredulity, and through not attending to the worship
and service of the gods, invented this art of making gods,—what
ought we to say, or rather to do, but to give to the
Lord our God all the thanks we are able, because He has
taken away those things by causes the contrary of those
which led to their institution? For that which the prevalence
of error instituted, the way of truth took away; that
which incredulity instituted, faith took away; that which
aversion from divine worship and service instituted, conversion
to the one true and holy God took away. Nor was this
the case only in Egypt, for which country alone the spirit of
the demons lamented in Hermes, but in all the earth, which
sings to the Lord a new song,[322] as the truly holy and truly
prophetic Scriptures have predicted, in which it is written,
“Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing unto the Lord, all the
earth.” For the title of this psalm is, “When the house
was built after the captivity.” For a house is being built
to the Lord in all the earth, even the city of God, which
is the holy Church, after that captivity in which demons
held captive those men who, through faith in God, became
living stones in the house. For although man made gods, it
did not follow that he who made them was not held captive
by them, when, by worshipping them, he was drawn into
fellowship with them,—into the fellowship not of stolid idols,
but of cunning demons; for what are idols but what they
are represented to be in the same Scriptures, “They have eyes,
but they do not see,”[323] and, though artistically fashioned, are[Pg 345]
still without life and sensation? But unclean spirits, associated
through that wicked art with these same idols, have
miserably taken captive the souls of their worshippers, by
bringing them down into fellowship with themselves. Whence
the apostle says, “We know that an idol is nothing, but
those things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to
demons, and not to God; and I would not ye should have
fellowship with demons.”[324] After this captivity, therefore, in
which men were held by malign demons, the house of God
is being built in all the earth; whence the title of that psalm
in which it is said, “Sing unto the Lord a new song; sing
unto the Lord, all the earth. Sing unto the Lord, bless His
name; declare well His salvation from day to day. Declare
His glory among the nations, among all people His wonderful
things. For great is the Lord, and much to be praised: He is
terrible above all gods. For all the gods of the nations are
demons: but the Lord made the heavens.”[325]

Wherefore he who sorrowed because a time was coming when
the worship of idols should be abolished, and the domination of
the demons over those who worshipped them, wished, under the
influence of a demon, that that captivity should always continue,
at the cessation of which that psalm celebrates the building of
the house of the Lord in all the earth. Hermes foretold these
things with grief, the prophet with joyfulness; and because
the Spirit is victorious who sang these things through the
ancient prophets, even Hermes himself was compelled in a
wonderful manner to confess, that those very things which
he wished not to be removed, and at the prospect of whose
removal he was sorrowful, had been instituted, not by prudent,
faithful, and religious, but by erring and unbelieving men,
averse to the worship and service of the gods. And although
he calls them gods, nevertheless, when he says that they were
made by such men as we certainly ought not to be, he shows,
whether he will or not, that they are not to be worshipped by
those who do not resemble these image-makers, that is, by prudent,
faithful, and religious men, at the same time also making
it manifest that the very men who made them involved themselves
in the worship of those as gods who were not gods.[Pg 346]
For true is the saying of the prophet, “If a man make gods,
lo, they are no gods.”[326] Such gods, therefore, acknowledged
by such worshippers and made by such men, did Hermes call
“gods made by men,” that is to say, demons, through some
art of I know not what description, bound by the chains of
their own lusts to images. But, nevertheless, he did not
agree with that opinion of the Platonic Apuleius, of which
we have already shown the incongruity and absurdity, namely,
that they were interpreters and intercessors between the gods
whom God made, and men whom the same God made, bringing
to God the prayers of men, and from God the gifts given in
answer to these prayers. For it is exceedingly stupid to
believe that gods whom men have made have more influence
with gods whom God has made than men themselves have,
whom the very same God has made. And consider, too, that
it is a demon which, bound by a man to an image by means
of an impious art, has been made a god, but a god to such a
man only, not to every man. What kind of god, therefore, is
that which no man would make but one erring, incredulous,
and averse to the true God? Moreover, if the demons which
are worshipped in the temples, being introduced by some kind
of strange art into images, that is, into visible representations
of themselves, by those men who by this art made gods when
they were straying away from, and were averse to the worship
and service of the gods,—if, I say, those demons are neither
mediators nor interpreters between men and the gods, both
on account of their own most wicked and base manners, and
because men, though erring, incredulous, and averse from the
worship and service of the gods, are nevertheless beyond
doubt better than the demons whom they themselves have
evoked, then it remains to be affirmed that what power they
possess they possess as demons, doing harm by bestowing
pretended benefits,—harm all the greater for the deception,—or
else openly and undisguisedly doing evil to men. They cannot,
however, do anything of this kind unless where they are permitted
by the deep and secret providence of God, and then
only so far as they are permitted. When, however, they are
permitted, it is not because they, being midway between[Pg 347]
men and the gods, have through the friendship of the gods
great power over men; for these demons cannot possibly be
friends to the good gods who dwell in the holy and heavenly
habitation, by whom we mean holy angels and rational creatures,
whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or
powers, from whom they are as far separated in disposition
and character as vice is distant from virtue, wickedness from
goodness.

25. Concerning those things which may be common to the holy angels
and to men.

Wherefore we must by no means seek, through the supposed
mediation of demons, to avail ourselves of the benevolence or
beneficence of the gods, or rather of the good angels, but
through resembling them in the possession of a good will,
through which we are with them, and live with them, and
worship with them the same God, although we cannot see
them with the eyes of our flesh. But it is not in locality
we are distant from them, but in merit of life, caused by our
miserable unlikeness to them in will, and by the weakness
of our character; for the mere fact of our dwelling on earth
under the conditions of life in the flesh does not prevent our
fellowship with them. It is only prevented when we, in the
impurity of our hearts, mind earthly things. But in this
present time, while we are being healed that we may eventually
be as they are, we are brought near to them by faith, if
by their assistance we believe that He who is their blessedness
is also ours.

26. That all the religion of the pagans has reference to dead men.

It is certainly a remarkable thing how this Egyptian, when
expressing his grief that a time was coming when those things
would be taken away from Egypt, which he confesses to have
been invented by men erring, incredulous, and averse to the
service of divine religion, says, among other things, “Then
shall that land, the most holy place of shrines and temples,
be full of sepulchres and dead men,” as if, in sooth, if these
things were not taken away, men would not die! as if dead
bodies could be buried elsewhere than in the ground! as if,
as time advanced, the number of sepulchres must not necessarily
increase in proportion to the increase of the number of[Pg 348]
the dead! But they who are of a perverse mind, and opposed
to us, suppose that what he grieves for is that the memorials
of our martyrs were to succeed to their temples and shrines,
in order, forsooth, that they may have grounds for thinking
that gods were worshipped by the pagans in temples, but that
dead men are worshipped by us in sepulchres. For with such
blindness do impious men, as it were, stumble over mountains,
and will not see the things which strike their own eyes, that
they do not attend to the fact that in all the literature of the
pagans there are not found any, or scarcely any gods, who
have not been men, to whom, when dead, divine honours have
been paid. I will not enlarge on the fact that Varro says
that all dead men are thought by them to be gods Manes, and
proves it by those sacred rites which are performed in honour
of almost all the dead, among which he mentions funeral
games, considering this the very highest proof of divinity,
because games are only wont to be celebrated in honour of
divinities. Hermes himself, of whom we are now treating, in
that same book in which, as if foretelling future things, he
says with sorrow, “Then shall that land, the most holy place
of shrines and temples, be full of sepulchres and dead men,”
testifies that the gods of Egypt were dead men. For, having
said that their forefathers, erring very far with respect to the
knowledge of the gods, incredulous and inattentive to the
divine worship and service, invented the art of making gods,
with which art, when invented, they associated the appropriate
virtue which is inherent in universal nature, and by mixing
up that virtue with this art, they called forth the souls of
demons or of angels (for they could not make souls), and
caused them to take possession of, or associate themselves
with holy images and divine mysteries, in order that through
these souls the images might have power to do good or harm
to men;—having said this, he goes on, as it were, to prove
it by illustrations, saying, “Thy grandsire, O Æsculapius, the
first discoverer of medicine, to whom a temple was consecrated
in a mountain of Libya, near to the shore of the crocodiles, in
which temple lies his earthly man, that is, his body,—for the
better part of him, or rather the whole of him, if the whole
man is in the intelligent life, went back to heaven,—affords[Pg 349]
even now by his divinity all those helps to infirm men, which
formerly he was wont to afford to them by the art of medicine.”
He says, therefore, that a dead man was worshipped
as a god in that place where he had his sepulchre. He
deceives men by a falsehood, for the man “went back to
heaven.” Then he adds, “Does not Hermes, who was my
grandsire, and whose name I bear, abiding in the country
which is called by his name, help and preserve all mortals
who come to him from every quarter?” For this elder
Hermes, that is, Mercury, who, he says, was his grandsire, is
said to be buried in Hermopolis, that is, in the city called
by his name; so here are two gods whom he affirms to
have been men, Æsculapius and Mercury. Now concerning
Æsculapius, both the Greeks and the Latins think the same
thing; but as to Mercury, there are many who do not think
that he was formerly a mortal, though Hermes testifies that
he was his grandsire. But are these two different individuals
who were called by the same name? I will not dispute much
whether they are different individuals or not. It is sufficient
to know that this Mercury of whom Hermes speaks is, as well
as Æsculapius, a god who once was a man, according to the
testimony of this same Trismegistus, esteemed so great by his
countrymen, and also the grandson of Mercury himself.

Hermes goes on to say, “But do we know how many good
things Isis, the wife of Osiris, bestows when she is propitious,
and what great opposition she can offer when enraged?”
Then, in order to show that there were gods made by men
through this art, he goes on to say, “For it is easy for earthly
and mundane gods to be angry, being made and composed by
men out of either nature;” thus giving us to understand that
he believed that demons were formerly the souls of dead men,
which, as he says, by means of a certain art invented by men
very far in error, incredulous, and irreligious, were caused to
take possession of images, because they who made such gods
were not able to make souls. When, therefore, he says “either
nature,” he means soul and body,—the demon being the soul,
and the image the body. What, then, becomes of that mournful
complaint, that the land of Egypt, the most holy place
of shrines and temples, was to be full of sepulchres and[Pg 350]
dead men? Verily, the fallacious spirit, by whose inspiration
Hermes spoke these things, was compelled to confess through
him that even already that land was full of sepulchres and
of dead men, whom they were worshipping as gods. But it
was the grief of the demons which was expressing itself
through his mouth, who were sorrowing on account of the
punishments which were about to fall upon them at the
tombs of the martyrs. For in many such places they are
tortured and compelled to confess, and are cast out of the
bodies of men, of which they had taken possession.

27. Concerning the nature of the honour which the Christians pay to
their martyrs.

But, nevertheless, we do not build temples, and ordain
priests, rites, and sacrifices for these same martyrs; for they
are not our gods, but their God is our God. Certainly we
honour their reliquaries, as the memorials of holy men of God
who strove for the truth even to the death of their bodies,
that the true religion might be made known, and false and
fictitious religions exposed. For if there were some before
them who thought that these religions were really false and
fictitious, they were afraid to give expression to their convictions.
But who ever heard a priest of the faithful, standing
at an altar built for the honour and worship of God over the
holy body of some martyr, say in the prayers, I offer to thee
a sacrifice, O Peter, or O Paul, or O Cyprian? for it is to
God that sacrifices are offered at their tombs,—the God who
made them both men and martyrs, and associated them with
holy angels in celestial honour; and the reason why we pay
such honours to their memory is, that by so doing we may
both give thanks to the true God for their victories, and, by
recalling them afresh to remembrance, may stir ourselves up
to imitate them by seeking to obtain like crowns and palms,
calling to our help that same God on whom they called.
Therefore, whatever honours the religious may pay in the
places of the martyrs, they are but honours rendered to their
memory,[327] not sacred rites or sacrifices offered to dead men as
to gods. And even such as bring thither food,—which, indeed,
is not done by the better Christians, and in most places of[Pg 351]
the world is not done at all,—do so in order that it may be
sanctified to them through the merits of the martyrs, in the
name of the Lord of the martyrs, first presenting the food
and offering prayer, and thereafter taking it away to be eaten,
or to be in part bestowed upon the needy.[328] But he who
knows the one sacrifice of Christians, which is the sacrifice
offered in those places, also knows that these are not sacrifices
offered to the martyrs. It is, then, neither with divine honours
nor with human crimes, by which they worship their gods,
that we honour our martyrs; neither do we offer sacrifices to
them, or convert the crimes of the gods into their sacred rites.
For let those who will and can read the letter of Alexander
to his mother Olympias, in which he tells the things which
were revealed to him by the priest Leon, and let those who
have read it recall to memory what it contains, that they
may see what great abominations have been handed down to
memory, not by poets, but by the mystic writings of the
Egyptians, concerning the goddess Isis, the wife of Osiris, and
the parents of both, all of whom, according to these writings,
were royal personages. Isis, when sacrificing to her parents,
is said to have discovered a crop of barley, of which she
brought some ears to the king her husband, and his councillor
Mercurius, and hence they identify her with Ceres. Those
who read the letter may there see what was the character of
those people to whom when dead sacred rites were instituted
as to gods, and what those deeds of theirs were which furnished
the occasion for these rites. Let them not once dare to compare
in any respect those people, though they hold them to be
gods, to our holy martyrs, though we do not hold them to be
gods. For we do not ordain priests and offer sacrifices to our
martyrs, as they do to their dead men, for that would be incongruous,
undue, and unlawful, such being due only to God;
and thus we do not delight them with their own crimes, or
with such shameful plays as those in which the crimes of
the gods are celebrated, which are either real crimes committed
by them at a time when they were men, or else, if
they never were men, fictitious crimes invented for the pleasure
of noxious demons. The god of Socrates, if he had a[Pg 352]
god, cannot have belonged to this class of demons. But
perhaps they who wished to excel in this art of making gods,
imposed a god of this sort on a man who was a stranger to,
and innocent of any connection with that art. What need we
say more? No one who is even moderately wise imagines
that demons are to be worshipped on account of the blessed
life which is to be after death. But perhaps they will say
that all the gods are good, but that of the demons some are
bad and some good, and that it is the good who are to be
worshipped, in order that through them we may attain to the
eternally blessed life. To the examination of this opinion we
will devote the following book.

---

[Pg 353]