BOOK TWELFTH.

Argument

AUGUSTINE FIRST INSTITUTES TWO INQUIRIES REGARDING THE ANGELS; NAMELY,
WHENCE IS THERE IN SOME A GOOD, AND IN OTHERS AN EVIL WILL? AND,
WHAT IS THE REASON OF THE BLESSEDNESS OF THE GOOD, AND THE MISERY
OF THE EVIL? AFTERWARDS HE TREATS OF THE CREATION OF MAN, AND
TEACHES THAT HE IS NOT FROM ETERNITY, BUT WAS CREATED, AND BY
NONE OTHER THAN GOD.

1. That the nature of the angels, both good and bad, is one and the same.

It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the
two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak
of the creation of man, and show how the cities took their
rise, so far as regards the race of rational mortals, I see that
I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may demonstrate
that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak of a society
composed of angels and men together; so that there are not
four cities or societies,—two, namely, of angels, and as many
of men,—but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the
other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.

That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have
arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since
God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them
both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible
to doubt. While some stedfastly continued in that which
was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in
His eternity, truth, and love; others, being enamoured rather
of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed
to this private good of their own, from that higher and beatific
good which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity
of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity
for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship,
they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore,
of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so
the cause of the others’ misery will be found in the contrary,[Pg 482]
that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when
the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly
answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked,
why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because
they do not adhere to God,—then there is no other good for
the rational or intellectual creature save God only. Thus,
though it is not every creature that can be blessed (for beasts,
trees, stones, and things of that kind have not this capacity),
yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of
itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by
whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession
of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is
blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable,
because he cannot lose himself.

Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but
the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are
indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not
out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are
not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those
mutable things which can adhere to the immutable good, and
so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their
good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And
the other created things in the universe are not better on this
account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would
say that the other members of the body are superior to the
eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient
nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which
can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is
more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and
can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so,
then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that
though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness
by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and
since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and
cannot be thus blessed save in God,—in this nature, I say,
not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault.[520] Now every fault
injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature.
The creature, therefore, which cleaves to God, differs from[Pg 483]
those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by
this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble
and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the fault
of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault
because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we
say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight
belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that
deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is thereby proved to
belong to their nature;—so, when we say that it is a fault of
the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, we hereby
most plainly declare that it pertained to its nature to cleave
to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how
great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him,
to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy
this so great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus,
since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of
the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof
that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to
it not to be with God.

2. That there is no entity[521] contrary to the divine, because nonentity seems to be
that which is wholly opposite to Him who supremely and always is.

This may be enough to prevent any one from supposing,
when we speak of the apostate angels, that they could have
another nature, derived, as it were, from some different origin,
and not from God. From the great impiety of this error we
shall disentangle ourselves the more readily and easily, the
more distinctly we understand that which God spoke by the
angel when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: “I am
that I am.”[522] For since God is the supreme existence, that is
to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things
that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely
like Himself. To some He communicated a more ample, to
others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures
of beings in ranks. For as from sapere comes sapientia, so
from esse comes essentia,—a new word indeed, which the old
Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our
day,[523] that our language may not want an equivalent for the
Greek οὐσία. For this is expressed word for word by essentia.[Pg 484]
Consequently, to that nature which supremely is, and which
created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that
which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that
which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the
Supreme Being, and Author of all beings whatsoever.

3. That the enemies of God are so, not by nature but by will, which, as it injures
them, injures a good nature; for if vice does not injure, it is not vice.

In Scripture they are called God’s enemies who oppose His
rule, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt
Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not
through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him.
For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against injury.
Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His
enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves.
And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good
of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is
contrary to God. For that which is evil is contrary to the
good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good?
Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further,
the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good
also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as
evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as
evil and as hurtful. For to God no evils are hurtful; but
only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony
of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they
not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt
them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare,
virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice is wont to
diminish or destroy? But if there be no good to take away,
then no injury can be done, and consequently there can be no
vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless
vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the
unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because
it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may
be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and
cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, therefore,
can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for
even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far
indeed as they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they[Pg 485]
are natures they are good. And when a vitiated nature is
punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has
this also, that it is not unpunished.[524] For this is just, and
certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished
for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which
by the force of habit and long continuance has become a
second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we
are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental
capacity for that enlightenment which discriminates between
what is just and what is unjust.

4. Of the nature of irrational and lifeless creatures, which in their own kind
and order do not mar the beauty of the universe.

But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and
trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are void of
intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should
destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received,
at their Creator’s will, an existence fitting them, by passing
away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of
beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a
requisite part of this world. For things earthly were neither
to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though
inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then,
in those situations where such things are appropriate, some
perish to make way for others that are born in their room,
and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are
overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have
the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory.
Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our
mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot
perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend
us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty.
And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the
wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe
it, lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find
any fault with the work of so great an Artificer. At the same
time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly[Pg 486]
things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to
illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are
all originated and created by God; for it is that which pleases
us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by
the fault,—unless even the natures themselves displease men,
as often happens when they become hurtful to them, and then
men estimate them not by their nature, but by their utility;
as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the
pride of the Egyptians. But in this way of estimating, they
may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or
debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun.
Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort,
but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures
are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the nature of the
eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is
most assuredly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful
than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What more useful
than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is
more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same
thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when
applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words
to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must
not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find
fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their
convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not
to be burnt. But they forget that this very light which is so
pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and
in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals
find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life.

5. That in all natures, of every kind and rank, God is glorified.

All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore
a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony,
are certainly good. And when they are in the places
assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve
such being as they have received. And those things which
have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or
for worse, so as to suit the wants and motions of those things
to which the Creator’s law has made them subservient; and[Pg 487]
thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is
embraced in the general scheme of the government of the
universe. So that, though the corruption of transitory and
perishable things brings them to utter destruction, it does not
prevent their producing that which was designed to be their
result. And this being so, God, who supremely is, and who
therefore created every being which has not supreme existence
(for that which was made of nothing could not be equal to
Him, and indeed could not be at all had He not made it), is
not to be found fault with on account of the creature’s faults,
but is to be praised in view of the natures He has made.

6. What the cause of the blessedness of the good angels is, and what the
cause of the misery of the wicked.

Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels
is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely
is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it
occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable
because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have
turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this
vice, what else is it called than pride? For “pride is the
beginning of sin.”[525] They were unwilling, then, to preserve
their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the
condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished
it by preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect,
and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature,
which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding
its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst
by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature
at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore
wretched.

If the further question be asked, What was the efficient
cause of their evil will? there is none. For what is it which
makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the
action bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of
the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad
will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or
has not a will. If it has, the will is either good or bad. If
good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good will[Pg 488]
makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be
the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other
hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know
what made it so; and that we may not go on for ever, I ask
at once, what made the first evil will bad? For that is not
the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that
is the first which was made evil by no other will. For if it
were preceded by that which made it evil, that will was first
which made the other evil. But if it is replied, “Nothing
made it evil; it always was evil,” I ask if it has been existing
in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all;
and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted
it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good.
And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature,
but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice
could injure. For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently
the will in which it was, could not be called evil.
But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing
good. And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was
suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been
previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to
diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity,
who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested
in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the
will evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior,
or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How,
then, has it no will, and not rather a good will? The same
reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long as two things
have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other
an evil will. Then remains the supposition that that which
corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned,
was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing,
be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself
good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of
its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good
thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can
good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what
is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil—not
because that is evil to which it turns, but because the[Pg 489]
turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing
which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become
so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing.
For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see
the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the
sight to desire an illicit enjoyment, while the other stedfastly
maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose
brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not
in the other? What produces it in the man in whom it
exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally
to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil
will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked?
But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition?
But why not the disposition of both? For we
are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body
and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a
secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his
own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement
whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which
he presented to the evil suasive influence,—what was the
cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty
as this, if both are tempted equally, and one yields and consents
to the temptation, while the other remains unmoved by
it, what other account can we give of the matter than this,
that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from
chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases
at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament
is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the
eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both
with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case,
therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the
one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made his
will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil
but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good?
Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in
body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who
persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to
desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of
both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he[Pg 490]
corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before
his will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it
because his will was a nature, or because it was made of
nothing? We shall find that the latter is the case. For if
a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say
than that evil arises from good, or that good is the cause of
evil? And how can it come to pass that a nature, good though
mutable, should produce any evil—that is to say, should make
the will itself wicked?

7. That we ought not to expect to find any efficient cause of the evil will.

Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil
will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is
not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection
from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being,—this
is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to
discover the causes of these defections,—causes, as I have
said, not efficient, but deficient,—is as if some one sought to
see darkness, or hear silence. Yet both of these are known
by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter
only by the ear; but not by their positive actuality,[526] but by
their want of it. Let no one, then, seek to know from me
what I know that I do not know; unless he perhaps wishes
to learn to be ignorant of that of which all we know is, that
it cannot be known. For those things which are known not
by their actuality, but by their want of it, are known, if our
expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing
them, that by knowing them they may be not known. For
when the eyesight surveys objects that strike the sense, it
nowhere sees darkness but where it begins not to see. And
so no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, and yet it
is only perceived by not hearing. Thus, too, our mind perceives
intelligible forms by understanding them; but when
they are deficient, it knows them by not knowing them; for
“who can understand defects?”[527]

8. Of the misdirected love whereby the will fell away from the immutable
to the mutable good.

This I do know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere,[Pg 491]
nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing
can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and
the more good they do (for then they do something positive),
the more they have efficient causes; but in so far as they are
defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is
their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes. And I
know likewise, that the will could not become evil, were it
unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly
punished, being not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections
are not to evil things, but are themselves evil; that is
to say, are not towards things that are naturally and in themselves
evil, but the defection of the will is evil, because it is
contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of that
which has supreme being for that which has less. For avarice
is not a fault inherent in gold, but in the man who inordinately
loves gold, to the detriment of justice, which ought to
be held in incomparably higher regard than gold. Neither is
luxury the fault of lovely and charming objects, but of the
heart that inordinately loves sensual pleasures, to the neglect
of temperance, which attaches us to objects more lovely in
their spirituality, and more delectable by their incorruptibility.
Nor yet is boasting the fault of human praise, but of the soul
that is inordinately fond of the applause of men, and that
makes light of the voice of conscience. Pride, too, is not the
fault of him who delegates power, nor of power itself, but of
the soul that is inordinately enamoured of its own power, and
despises the more just dominion of a higher authority. Consequently
he who inordinately loves the good which any
nature possesses, even though he obtain it, himself becomes
evil in the good, and wretched because deprived of a greater
good.

9. Whether the angels, besides receiving from God their nature, received from
Him also their good will by the Holy Spirit imbuing them with love.

There is, then, no natural efficient cause, or, if I may be
allowed the expression, no essential cause, of the evil will,
since itself is the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which
the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted; and
the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from
God,—a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient.[Pg 492]
But as to the good will, if we should say that there
is no efficient cause of it, we must beware of giving currency
to the opinion that the good will of the good angels is not
created, but is co-eternal with God. For if they themselves
are created, how can we say that their good will was eternal?
But if created, was it created along with themselves, or did
they exist for a time without it? If along with themselves,
then doubtless it was created by Him who created them, and,
as soon as ever they were created, they attached themselves
to Him who created them, with the love He created in them.
And they are separated from the society of the rest, because
they have continued in the same good will; while the others
have fallen away to another will, which is an evil one, by the
very fact of its being a falling away from the good; from
which, we may add, they would not have fallen away had
they been unwilling to do so. But if the good angels existed
for a time without a good will, and produced it in themselves
without God’s interference, then it follows that they made
themselves better than He made them. Away with such a
thought! For without a good will, what were they but evil?
Or if they were not evil, because they had not an evil will
any more than a good one (for they had not fallen away from
that which as yet they had not begun to enjoy), certainly they
were not the same, not so good, as when they came to have
a good will. Or if they could not make themselves better
than they were made by Him who is surpassed by none in
His work, then certainly, without His helpful operation,
they could not come to possess that good will which made
them better. And though their good will effected that they
did not turn to themselves, who had a more stinted existence,
but to Him who supremely is, and that, being united to Him,
their own being was enlarged, and they lived a wise and
blessed life by His communications to them, what does this
prove but that the will, however good it might be, would
have continued helplessly only to desire Him, had not He
who had made their nature out of nothing, and yet capable of
enjoying Him, first stimulated it to desire Him, and then
filled it with Himself, and so made it better?

Besides, this too has to be inquired into, whether, if the[Pg 493]
good angels made their own will good, they did so with or
without will? If without, then it was not their doing. If
with, was the will good or bad? If bad, how could a bad
will give birth to a good one? If good, then already they had
a good will. And who made this will, which already they
had, but He who created them with a good will, or with that
chaste love by which they cleaved to Him, in one and the
same act creating their nature, and endowing it with grace?
And thus we are driven to believe that the holy angels never
existed without a good will or the love of God. But the
angels who, though created good, are yet evil now, became so
by their own will. And this will was not made evil by their
good nature, unless by its voluntary defection from good;
for good is not the cause of evil, but a defection from good
is. These angels, therefore, either received less of the grace
of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or
if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by
their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and
attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became
certain they should never fall from it,—as we have already
shown in the preceding book.[528] We must therefore acknowledge,
with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of
holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that
“the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy
Ghost, which is given unto them.”[529] And that not only of
men, but primarily and principally of angels it is true, as it
is written, “It is good to draw near to God.”[530] And those
who have this good in common, have, both with Him to
whom they draw near, and with one another, a holy fellowship,
and form one city of God—His living sacrifice, and His
living temple. And I see that, as I have now spoken of the
rise of this city among the angels, it is time to speak of the
origin of that part of it which is hereafter to be united to the
immortal angels, and which at present is being gathered from
among mortal men, and is either sojourning on earth, or, in
the persons of those who have passed through death, is resting
in the secret receptacles and abodes of disembodied spirits.
For from one man, whom God created as the first, the whole[Pg 494]
human race descended, according to the faith of Holy Scripture,
which deservedly is of wonderful authority among all
nations throughout the world; since, among its other true
statements, it predicted, by its divine foresight, that all nations
would give credit to it.

10. Of the falseness of the history which allots many thousand years to the
world’s past.

Let us, then, omit the conjectures of men who know not
what they say, when they speak of the nature and origin of
the human race. For some hold the same opinion regarding
men that they hold regarding the world itself, that they have
always been. Thus Apuleius says when he is describing our
race, “Individually they are mortal, but collectively, and as
a race, they are immortal.”[531] And when they are asked, how,
if the human race has always been, they vindicate the truth
of their history, which narrates who were the inventors, and
what they invented, and who first instituted the liberal studies
and the other arts, and who first inhabited this or that region,
and this or that island? they reply[532] that most, if not all
lands, were so desolated at intervals by fire and flood, that
men were greatly reduced in numbers, and from these, again,
the population was restored to its former numbers, and that
thus there was at intervals a new beginning made, and though
those things which had been interrupted and checked by the
severe devastations were only renewed, yet they seemed to be
originated then, but that man could not exist at all save as
produced by man. But they say what they think, not what
they know.

They are deceived, too, by those highly mendacious documents
which profess to give the history of many thousand
years, though, reckoning by the sacred writings, we find that
not 6000 years have yet passed.[533] And, not to spend many
words in exposing the baselessness of these documents, in[Pg 495]
which so many thousands of years are accounted for, nor
in proving that their authorities are totally inadequate, let
me cite only that letter which Alexander the Great wrote to
his mother Olympias,[534] giving her the narrative he had from
an Egyptian priest, which he had extracted from their sacred
archives, and which gave an account of kingdoms mentioned
also by the Greek historians. In this letter of Alexander’s a
term of upwards of 5000 years is assigned to the kingdom of
Assyria; while in the Greek history only 1300 years are
reckoned from the reign of Bel himself, whom both Greek
and Egyptian agree in counting the first king of Assyria.
Then to the empire of the Persians and Macedonians this
Egyptian assigned more than 8000 years, counting to the
time of Alexander, to whom he was speaking; while among
the Greeks, 485 years are assigned to the Macedonians down
to the death of Alexander, and to the Persians 233 years,
reckoning to the termination of his conquests. Thus these
give a much smaller number of years than the Egyptians;
and indeed, though multiplied three times, the Greek chronology
would still be shorter. For the Egyptians are said to
have formerly reckoned only four months to their year;[535] so
that one year, according to the fuller and truer computation
now in use among them as well as among ourselves, would
comprehend three of their old years. But not even thus, as I
said, does the Greek history correspond with the Egyptian in
its chronology. And therefore the former must receive the
greater credit, because it does not exceed the true account of
the duration of the world as it is given by our documents,
which are truly sacred. Further, if this letter of Alexander,
which has become so famous, differs widely in this matter of
chronology from the probable credible account, how much
less can we believe these documents which, though full of
fabulous and fictitious antiquities, they would fain oppose to
the authority of our well-known and divine books, which predicted[Pg 496]
that the whole world would believe them, and which
the whole world accordingly has believed; which proved, too,
that it had truly narrated past events by its prediction of
future events, which have so exactly come to pass!

11. Of those who suppose that this world indeed is not eternal, but that either
there are numberless worlds, or that one and the same world is perpetually
resolved into its elements, and renewed at the conclusion of fixed cycles.

There are some, again, who, though they do not suppose
that this world is eternal, are of opinion either that this is
not the only world, but that there are numberless worlds, or
that indeed it is the only one, but that it dies, and is born
again at fixed intervals, and this times without number;[536] but
they must acknowledge that the human race existed before
there were other men to beget them. For they cannot suppose
that, if the whole world perish, some men would be left
alive in the world, as they might survive in floods and conflagrations,
which those other speculators suppose to be partial,
and from which they can therefore reasonably argue that a
few men survived whose posterity would renew the population;
but as they believe that the world itself is renewed out
of its own material, so they must believe that out of its elements
the human race was produced, and then that the progeny of
mortals sprang like that of other animals from their parents.

12. How these persons are to be answered, who find fault with the creation of
man on the score of its recent date.

As to those who are always asking why man was not
created during these countless ages of the infinitely extended
past, and came into being so lately that, according to Scripture,
less than 6000 years have elapsed since he began to be, I
would reply to them regarding the creation of man, just as I
replied regarding the origin of the world to those who will
not believe that it is not eternal, but had a beginning, which
even Plato himself most plainly declares, though some think
his statement was not consistent with his real opinion.[537] If it[Pg 497]
offends them that the time that has elapsed since the creation
of man is so short, and his years so few according to our
authorities, let them take this into consideration, that nothing
that has a limit is long, and that all the ages of time being
finite, are very little, or indeed nothing at all, when compared
to the interminable eternity. Consequently, if there had
elapsed since the creation of man, I do not say five or six, but
even sixty or six hundred thousand years, or sixty times as
many, or six hundred or six hundred thousand times as many,
or this sum multiplied until it could no longer be expressed
in numbers, the same question could still be put, Why was
he not made before? For the past and boundless eternity
during which God abstained from creating man is so great,
that, compare it with what vast and untold number of ages
you please, so long as there is a definite conclusion of this
term of time, it is not even as if you compared the minutest
drop of water with the ocean that everywhere flows around
the globe. For of these two, one indeed is very small, the
other incomparably vast, yet both are finite; but that space of
time which starts from some beginning, and is limited by some
termination, be it of what extent it may, if you compare
it with that which has no beginning, I know not whether to
say we should count it the very minutest thing, or nothing at
all. For, take this limited time, and deduct from the end of it,
one by one, the briefest moments (as you might take day by day
from a man’s life, beginning at the day in which he now lives,
back to that of his birth), and though the number of moments
you must subtract in this backward movement be so great
that no word can express it, yet this subtraction will some
time carry you to the beginning. But if you take away from
a time which has no beginning, I do not say brief moments
one by one, nor yet hours, or days, or months, or years even
in quantities, but terms of years so vast that they cannot be
named by the most skilful arithmetician,—take away terms of
years as vast as that which we have supposed to be gradually
consumed by the deduction of moments,—and take them away
not once and again repeatedly, but always, and what do you
effect, what do you make by your deduction, since you never
reach the beginning which has no existence? Wherefore, that[Pg 498]
which we now demand after five thousand odd years, our
descendants might with like curiosity demand after six hundred
thousand years, supposing these dying generations of men
continue so long to decay and be renewed, and supposing posterity
continues as weak and ignorant as ourselves. The same
question might have been asked by those who have lived before
us, and while man was even newer upon earth. The first man
himself, in short, might, the day after, or the very day of his
creation, have asked why he was created no sooner. And no
matter at what earlier or later period he had been created, this
controversy about the commencement of this world’s history
would have had precisely the same difficulties as it has now.

13. Of the revolution of the ages, which some philosophers believe will bring all
things round again, after a certain fixed cycle, to the same order and
form as at first.

This controversy some philosophers have seen no other
approved means of solving than by introducing cycles of time,
in which there should be a constant renewal and repetition of
the order of nature;[538] and they have therefore asserted that
these cycles will ceaselessly recur, one passing away and another
coming, though they are not agreed as to whether one permanent
world shall pass through all these cycles, or whether
the world shall at fixed intervals die out, and be renewed so
as to exhibit a recurrence of the same phenomena—the things
which have been, and those which are to be, coinciding. And
from this fantastic vicissitude they exempt not even the immortal
soul that has attained wisdom, consigning it to a ceaseless
transmigration between delusive blessedness and real
misery. For how can that be truly called blessed which has
no assurance of being so eternally, and is either in ignorance
of the truth, and blind to the misery that is approaching, or,
knowing it, is in misery and fear? Or if it passes to bliss,
and leaves miseries for ever, then there happens in time a
new thing which time shall not end. Why not, then, the
world also? Why may not man, too, be a similar thing?
So that, by following the straight path of sound doctrine, we[Pg 499]
escape, I know not what circuitous paths, discovered by deceiving
and deceived sages.

Some, too, in advocating these recurring cycles that restore
all things to their original, cite in favour of their supposition
what Solomon says in the book of Ecclesiastes: “What is that
which hath been? It is that which shall be. And what is
that which is done? It is that which shall be done: and
there is no new thing under the sun. Who can speak and
say, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time, which
was before us.”[539] This he said either of those things of which he
had just been speaking—the succession of generations, the orbit
of the sun, the course of rivers,—or else of all kinds of creatures
that are born and die. For men were before us, are with us,
and shall be after us; and so all living things and all plants.
Even monstrous and irregular productions, though differing
from one another, and though some are reported as solitary
instances, yet resemble one another generally, in so far as they
are miraculous and monstrous, and, in this sense, have been,
and shall be, and are no new and recent things under the
sun. However, some would understand these words as meaning
that in the predestination of God all things have already
existed, and that thus there is no new thing under the sun.
At all events, far be it from any true believer to suppose
that by these words of Solomon those cycles are meant, in
which, according to those philosophers, the same periods
and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the
philosopher Plato, having taught in the school at Athens
which is called the Academy, so, numberless ages before,
at long but certain intervals, this same Plato, and the same
school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be
repeated during the countless cycles that are yet be be,—far
be it, I say, from us to believe this. For once Christ died
for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dieth no more.
“Death hath no more dominion over Him;”[540] and we ourselves
after the resurrection shall be “ever with the Lord,”[541] to whom
we now say, as the sacred Psalmist dictates, “Thou shalt keep
us, O Lord, Thou shalt preserve us from this generation.”[Pg 500][542]
And that too which follows, is, I think, appropriate enough:
“The wicked walk in a circle;” not because their life is to
recur by means of these circles, which these philosophers
imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine
now runs is circuitous.

14. Of the creation of the human race in time, and how this was effected
without any new design or change of purpose on God’s part.

What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find
neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the
human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin,
nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot
penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself
eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a
beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made, He
made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by
His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out
the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the
inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will,
created man, who had never before been, and gave him an
existence in time, and increased the human race from one
individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first
said, “Thou shalt keep us, O Lord, Thou shalt preserve us
from this generation for ever,” and had then rebuked those
whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no
eternal deliverance and blessedness, adds immediately, “The
wicked walk in a circle.” Then, as if it were said to him,
“What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe
that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He
had never before made in a past eternity,—God, to whom
nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness?”
the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself,
“According to the depth of Thy wisdom Thou hast multiplied
the children of men.” Let men, he seems to say, fancy what
they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to
them, but Thou hast multiplied the children of men according
to the depth of thy wisdom, which no man can comprehend.
For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that
man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in
time, and this without changing His design and will.

[Pg 501]

15. Whether we are to believe that God, as He has always been sovereign Lord,
has always had creatures over whom He exercised His sovereignty; and
in what sense we can say that the creature has always been, and yet cannot
say it is co-eternal.

For my own part, indeed, as I dare not say that there ever
was a time when the Lord God was not Lord,[543] so I ought not
to doubt that man had no existence before time, and was first
created in time. But when I consider what God could be the
Lord of, if there was not always some creature, I shrink from
making any assertion, remembering my own insignificance, and
that it is written, “What man is he that can know the
counsel of God? or who can think what the will of the Lord
is? For the thoughts of mortal men are timid, and our
devices are but uncertain. For the corruptible body presseth
down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the
mind that museth upon many things.”[544] Many things certainly
do I muse upon in this earthly tabernacle, because the one thing
which is true among the many, or beyond the many, I cannot
find. If, then, among these many thoughts, I say that there
have always been creatures for Him to be Lord of, who is
always and ever has been Lord, but that these creatures have
not always been the same, but succeeded one another (for we
would not seem to say that any is co-eternal with the Creator,
an assertion condemned equally by faith and sound reason), I
must take care lest I fall into the absurd and ignorant error
of maintaining that by these successions and changes mortal
creatures have always existed, whereas the immortal creatures
had not begun to exist until the date of our own world, when
the angels were created; if at least the angels are intended
by that light which was first made, or, rather, by that heaven
of which it is said, “In the beginning God created the heavens
and the earth.”[545] The angels at least did not exist before
they were created; for if we say that they have always
existed, we shall seem to make them co-eternal with the
Creator. Again, if I say that the angels were not created in
time, but existed before all times, as those over whom God,
who has ever been Sovereign, exercised His sovereignty, then
I shall be asked whether, if they were created before all time,[Pg 502]
they, being creatures, could possibly always exist. It may
perhaps be replied, Why not always, since that which is in
all time may very properly be said to be “always?” Now,
so true is it that these angels have existed in all time, that
even before time was, they were created; if at least time
began with the heavens, and the angels existed before the
heavens. And if time was even before the heavenly bodies, not
indeed marked by hours, days, months, and years,—for these
measures of time’s periods which are commonly and properly
called times, did manifestly begin with the motion of the
heavenly bodies, and so God said, when He appointed them,
“Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for
years,”[546]—if, I say, time was before these heavenly bodies by some
changing movement, whose parts succeeded one another and
could not exist simultaneously, and if there was some such
movement among the angels which necessitated the existence
of time, and that they from their very creation should be subject
to these temporal changes, then they have existed in all
time, for time came into being along with them. And who
will say that what was in all time, was not always?

But if I make such a reply, it will be said to me, How, then,
are they not co-eternal with the Creator, if He and they
always have been? How even can they be said to have
been created, if we are to understand that they have always
existed? What shall we reply to this? Shall we say that
both statements are true? that they always have been, since
they have been in all time, they being created along with
time, or time along with them, and yet that also they were
created? For, similarly, we will not deny that time itself
was created, though no one doubts that time has been in all
time; for if it has not been in all time, then there was a time
when there was no time. But the most foolish person could
not make such an assertion. For we can reasonably say
there was a time when Rome was not; there was a time
when Jerusalem was not; there was a time when Abraham
was not; there was a time when man was not, and so on:
in fine, if the world was not made at the commencement
of time, but after some time had elapsed, we can say there[Pg 503]
was a time when the world was not. But to say there
was a time when time was not, is as absurd as to say
there was a man when there was no man; or, this world was
when this world was not. For if we are not referring to
the same object, the form of expression may be used, as, there
was another man when this man was not. Thus we can
reasonably say there was another time when this time was
not; but not the merest simpleton could say there was a
time when there was no time. As, then, we say that time
was created, though we also say that it always has been,
since in all time time has been, so it does not follow that if
the angels have always been, they were therefore not created.
For we say that they have always been, because they have
been in all time; and we say they have been in all time,
because time itself could no wise be without them. For
where there is no creature whose changing movements admit
of succession, there cannot be time at all. And consequently,
even if they have always existed, they were created; neither,
if they have always existed, are they therefore co-eternal with
the Creator. For He has always existed in unchangeable
eternity; while they were created, and are said to have been
always, because they have been in all time, time being impossible
without the creature. But time passing away by its
changefulness, cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity.
And consequently, though the immortality of the angels does
not pass in time, does not become past as if now it were not,
nor has a future as if it were not yet, still their movements,
which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and
therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in whose
movement we cannot say that there has been that which now
is not, or shall be that which is not yet. Wherefore, if God
always has been Lord, He has always had creatures under His
dominion,—creatures, however, not begotten of Him, but created
by Him out of nothing; nor co-eternal with Him, for He was
before them, though at no time without them, because He
preceded them, not by the lapse of time, but by His abiding
eternity. But if I make this reply to those who demand
how He was always Creator, always Lord, if there were not
always a subject creation; or how this was created, and not[Pg 504]
rather co-eternal with its Creator, if it always was, I fear I
may be accused of recklessly affirming what I know not,
instead of teaching what I know. I return, therefore, to that
which our Creator has seen fit that we should know; and those
things which He has allowed the abler men to know in this
life, or has reserved to be known in the next by the perfected
saints, I acknowledge to be beyond my capacity. But I have
thought it right to discuss these matters without making
positive assertions, that they who read may be warned to abstain
from hazardous questions, and may not deem themselves
fit for everything. Let them rather endeavour to obey the
wholesome injunction of the apostle, when he says, “For I
say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is
among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought
to think; but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt
to every man the measure of faith.”[547] For if an infant receive
nourishment suited to its strength, it becomes capable, as it
grows, of taking more; but if its strength and capacity be
overtaxed, it dwines away in place of growing.

16. How we are to understand God’s promise of life eternal, which was
uttered before the “eternal times.”

I own that I do not know what ages passed before the
human race was created, yet I have no doubt that no created
thing is co-eternal with the Creator. But even the apostle
speaks of time as eternal, and this with reference, not to the
future, but, which is more surprising, to the past. For he
says, “In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie promised
before the eternal times, but hath in due times manifested
His word.”[548] You see he says that in the past there
have been eternal times, which, however, were not co-eternal
with God. And since God before these eternal times not
only existed, but also “promised” life eternal, which He
manifested in its own times (that is to say, in due times),
what else is this than His word? For this is life eternal.
But then, how did He promise; for the promise was made to
men, and yet they had no existence before eternal times?[Pg 505]
Does this not mean that, in His own eternity, and in His
co-eternal word, that which was to be in its own time was
already predestined and fixed?

17. What defence is made by sound faith regarding God’s unchangeable counsel
and will, against the reasonings of those who hold that the works of God
are eternally repeated in revolving cycles that restore all things as they were.

Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the first man was
created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same
man himself recurring by I know not what cycles, and having
made I know not how many revolutions, nor any other of
similar nature. From this belief I am not frightened by
philosophical arguments, among which that is reckoned the
most acute which is founded on the assertion that the infinite
cannot be comprehended by any mode of knowledge. Consequently,
they argue, God has in His own mind finite conceptions
of all finite things which He makes. Now it cannot
be supposed that His goodness was ever idle; for if it were,
there should be ascribed to Him an awakening to activity in
time, from a past eternity of inactivity, as if He repented of
an idleness that had no beginning, and proceeded, therefore, to
make a beginning of work. This being the case, they say it
must be that the same things are always repeated, and that
as they pass, so they are destined always to return, whether
amidst all these changes the world remains the same,—the
world which has always been, and yet was created,—or that
the world in these revolutions is perpetually dying out and
being renewed; otherwise, if we point to a time when the
works of God were begun, it would be believed that He considered
His past eternal leisure to be inert and indolent, and
therefore condemned and altered it as displeasing to Himself.
Now if God is supposed to have been indeed always making
temporal things, but different from one another, and one after
the other, so that He thus came at last to make man, whom
He had never made before, then it may seem that He made
man not with knowledge (for they suppose no knowledge can
comprehend the infinite succession of creatures), but at the
dictate of the hour, as it struck Him at the moment, with a
sudden and accidental change of mind. On the other hand,
say they, if those cycles be admitted, and if we suppose that[Pg 506]
the same temporal things are repeated, while the world either
remains identical through all these rotations, or else dies away
and is renewed, then there is ascribed to God neither the
slothful ease of a past eternity, nor a rash and unforeseen
creation. And if the same things be not thus repeated in
cycles, then they cannot by any science or prescience be comprehended
in their endless diversity. Even though reason
could not refute, faith would smile at these argumentations,
with which the godless endeavour to turn our simple piety
from the right way, that we may walk with them “in a circle.”
But by the help of the Lord our God, even reason, and that
readily enough, shatters these revolving circles which conjecture
frames. For that which specially leads these men
astray to prefer their own circles to the straight path of
truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable,
and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely
unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and, without succession of
thought, counting all things without number. So that saying
of the apostle comes true of them, for, “comparing themselves
with themselves, they do not understand.”[549] For because they
do, in virtue of a new purpose, whatever new thing has occurred
to them to be done (their minds being changeable), they conclude
it is so with God; and thus compare, not God,—for they
cannot conceive God, but think of one like themselves when
they think of Him,—not God, but themselves, and not with
Him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe
that God is affected in one way when He works, in another
when He rests. Indeed, to say that He is affected at all, is
an abuse of language, since it implies that there comes to be
something in His nature which was not there before. For he
who is affected is acted upon, and whatever is acted upon is
changeable. In His leisure, therefore, is no laziness, indolence,
inactivity; as in His work is no labour, effort, industry. He
can act while He reposes, and repose while He acts. He can
begin a new work with (not a new, but) an eternal design;
and what He has not made before, He does not now begin
to make because He repents of His former repose. But[Pg 507]
when one speaks of His former repose and subsequent operation
(and I know not how men can understand these things),
this “former” and “subsequent” are applied only to the things
created, which formerly did not exist, and subsequently came
into existence. But in God the former purpose is not altered
and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but
by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected
regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long
as they were not, they should not be, and that subsequently,
when they began to be, they should come into existence.
And thus, perhaps, He would show in a very striking way, to
those who have eyes for such things, how independent He is
of what He makes, and how it is of His own gratuitous goodness
He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures
in no less perfect a blessedness.

18. Against those who assert that things that are infinite[550] cannot be
comprehended by the knowledge of God.

As for their other assertion, that God’s knowledge cannot
comprehend things infinite, it only remains for them to affirm,
in order that they may sound the depths of their impiety, that
God does not know all numbers. For it is very certain that
they are infinite; since, no matter at what number you suppose
an end to be made, this number can be, I will not say, increased
by the addition of one more, but however great it be,
and however vast be the multitude of which it is the rational
and scientific expression, it can still be not only doubled, but
even multiplied. Moreover, each number is so defined by its
own properties, that no two numbers are equal. They are
therefore both unequal and different from one another; and
while they are simply finite, collectively they are infinite.
Does God, therefore, not know numbers on account of this
infinity; and does His knowledge extend only to a certain
height in numbers, while of the rest He is ignorant? Who
is so left to himself as to say so? Yet they can hardly pretend
to put numbers out of the question, or maintain that they
have nothing to do with the knowledge of God; for Plato,[551]
their great authority, represents God as framing the world on[Pg 508]
numerical principles; and in our books also it is said to God,
“Thou hast ordered all things in number, and measure, and
weight.”[552] The prophet also says, “Who bringeth out their host
by number.”[553] And the Saviour says in the Gospel, “The very
hairs of your head are all numbered.”[554] Far be it, then, from
us to doubt that all number is known to Him “whose understanding,”
according to the Psalmist, “is infinite.”[555] The infinity
of number, though there be no numbering of infinite
numbers, is yet not incomprehensible by Him whose understanding
is infinite. And thus, if everything which is comprehended
is defined or made finite by the comprehension of
him who knows it, then all infinity is in some ineffable way
made finite to God, for it is comprehensible by His knowledge.
Wherefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the
knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended, what are we
poor creatures that we should presume to fix limits to His
knowledge, and say that unless the same temporal things be
repeated by the same periodic revolutions, God cannot either
foreknow His creatures that He may make them, or know
them when He has made them? God, whose knowledge is
simply manifold, and uniform in its variety, comprehends all
incomprehensibles with so incomprehensible a comprehension,
that though He willed always to make His later works novel
and unlike what went before them, He could not produce them
without order and foresight, nor conceive them suddenly, but
by His eternal foreknowledge.

19. Of worlds without end, or ages of ages.[556]

I do not presume to determine whether God does so, and
whether these times which are called “ages of ages” are joined
together in a continuous series, and succeed one another with
a regulated diversity, and leave exempt from their vicissitudes
only those who are freed from their misery, and abide without
end in a blessed immortality; or whether these are called
“ages of ages,” that we may understand that the ages remain
unchangeable in God’s unwavering wisdom, and are the efficient
causes, as it were, of those ages which are being spent in time.[Pg 509]
Possibly “ages” is used for “age,” so that nothing else is
meant by “ages of ages” than by “age of age,” as nothing
else is meant by “heavens of heavens” than by “heaven of
heaven.” For God called the firmament, above which are the
waters, “Heaven,” and yet the psalm says, “Let the waters that
are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord.”[557] Which
of these two meanings we are to attach to “ages of ages,” or
whether there is not some other and better meaning still, is a
very profound question; and the subject we are at present
handling presents no obstacle to our meanwhile deferring the
discussion of it, whether we may be able to determine anything
about it, or may only be made more cautious by its
further treatment, so as to be deterred from making any rash
affirmations in a matter of such obscurity. For at present we
are disputing the opinion that affirms the existence of those
periodic revolutions by which the same things are always recurring
at intervals of time. Now, whichever of these suppositions
regarding the “ages of ages” be the true one, it avails
nothing for the substantiating of those cycles; for whether the
ages of ages be not a repetition of the same world, but different
worlds succeeding one another in a regulated connection,
the ransomed souls abiding in well-assured bliss without any
recurrence of misery, or whether the ages of ages be the eternal
causes which rule what shall be and is in time, it equally
follows, that those cycles which bring round the same things
have no existence; and nothing more thoroughly explodes them
than the fact of the eternal life of the saints.

20. Of the impiety of those who assert that the souls which enjoy true and perfect
blessedness, must yet again and again in these periodic revolutions return
to labour and misery.

What pious ears could bear to hear that after a life spent
in so many and severe distresses (if, indeed, that should be
called a life at all which is rather a death, so utter that the
love of this present death makes us fear that death which delivers
us from it), that after evils so disastrous, and miseries of
all kinds have at length been expiated and finished by the help
of true religion and wisdom, and when we have thus attained
to the vision of God, and have entered into bliss by the contemplation[Pg 510]
of spiritual light and participation in His unchangeable
immortality, which we burn to attain,—that we must at
some time lose all this, and that they who do lose it are cast
down from that eternity, truth, and felicity to infernal mortality
and shameful foolishness, and are involved in accursed
woes, in which God is lost, truth held in detestation, and happiness
sought in iniquitous impurities? and that this will
happen endlessly again and again, recurring at fixed intervals,
and in regularly returning periods? and that this everlasting
and ceaseless revolution of definite cycles, which remove and
restore true misery and deceitful bliss in turn, is contrived in
order that God may be able to know His own works, since on
the one hand He cannot rest from creating, and on the other,
cannot know the infinite number of His creatures, if He always
makes creatures? Who, I say, can listen to such things?
Who can accept or suffer them to be spoken? Were they true,
it were not only more prudent to keep silence regarding them,
but even (to express myself as best I can) it were the part of
wisdom not to know them. For if in the future world we
shall not remember these things, and by this oblivion be blessed,
why should we now increase our misery, already burdensome
enough, by the knowledge of them? If, on the other hand,
the knowledge of them will be forced upon us hereafter, now
at least let us remain in ignorance, that in the present expectation
we may enjoy a blessedness which the future reality is
not to bestow; since in this life we are expecting to obtain
life everlasting, but in the world to come are to discover it to
be blessed, but not everlasting.

And if they maintain that no one can attain to the blessedness
of the world to come, unless in this life he has been indoctrinated
in those cycles in which bliss and misery relieve
one another, how do they avow that the more a man loves God,
the more readily he attains to blessedness,—they who teach
what paralyzes love itself? For who would not be more remiss
and lukewarm in his love for a person whom he thinks
he shall be forced to abandon, and whose truth and wisdom he
shall come to hate; and this, too, after he has quite attained
to the utmost and most blissful knowledge of Him that he is
capable of? Can any one be faithful in his love, even to a[Pg 511]
human friend, if he knows that he is destined to become his
enemy?[558] God forbid that there be any truth in an opinion
which threatens us with a real misery that is never to end, but
is often and endlessly to be interrupted by intervals of fallacious
happiness. For what happiness can be more fallacious and
false than that in whose blaze of truth we yet remain ignorant
that we shall be miserable, or in whose most secure citadel we
yet fear that we shall be so? For if, on the one hand, we are to
be ignorant of coming calamity, then our present misery is not so
shortsighted, for it is assured of coming bliss. If, on the other
hand, the disaster that threatens is not concealed from us in
the world to come, then the time of misery which is to be at
last exchanged for a state of blessedness, is spent by the soul
more happily than its time of happiness, which is to end in a
return to misery. And thus our expectation of unhappiness
is happy, but of happiness unhappy. And therefore, as we
here suffer present ills, and hereafter fear ills that are imminent,
it were truer to say that we shall always be miserable,
than that we can some time be happy.

But these things are declared to be false by the loud testimony
of religion and truth; for religion truthfully promises a
true blessedness, of which we shall be eternally assured, and
which cannot be interrupted by any disaster. Let us therefore
keep to the straight path, which is Christ, and, with Him
as our Guide and Saviour, let us turn away in heart and
mind from the unreal and futile cycles of the godless. Porphyry,
Platonist though he was, abjured the opinion of his
school, that in these cycles souls are ceaselessly passing away
and returning, either being struck with the extravagance of
the idea, or sobered by his knowledge of Christianity. As I
mentioned in the tenth book,[559] he preferred saying that the
soul, as it had been sent into the world that it might know
evil, and be purged and delivered from it, was never again
exposed to such an experience after it had once returned to[Pg 512]
the Father. And if he abjured the tenets of his school, how
much more ought we Christians to abominate and avoid an
opinion so unfounded and hostile to our faith? But having
disposed of these cycles and escaped out of them, no necessity
compels us to suppose that the human race had no beginning
in time, on the ground that there is nothing new in
nature which, by I know not what cycles, has not at some
previous period existed, and is not hereafter to exist again.
For if the soul, once delivered, as it never was before, is never
to return to misery, then there happens in its experience something
which never happened before; and this, indeed, something
of the greatest consequence, to wit, the secure entrance
into eternal felicity. And if in an immortal nature there can
occur a novelty, which never has been, nor ever shall be, reproduced
by any cycle, why is it disputed that the same may
occur in mortal natures? If they maintain that blessedness
is no new experience to the soul, but only a return to that
state in which it has been eternally, then at least its deliverance
from misery is something new, since, by their own showing,
the misery from which it is delivered is itself, too, a new
experience. And if this new experience fell out by accident,
and was not embraced in the order of things appointed by
Divine Providence, then where are those determinate and
measured cycles in which no new thing happens, but all
things are reproduced as they were before? If, however, this
new experience was embraced in that providential order of
nature (whether the soul was exposed to the evil of this world
for the sake of discipline, or fell into it by sin), then it is
possible for new things to happen which never happened
before, and which yet are not extraneous to the order of
nature. And if the soul is able by its own imprudence to
create for itself a new misery, which was not unforeseen by the
Divine Providence, but was provided for in the order of nature
along with the deliverance from it, how can we, even with
all the rashness of human vanity, presume to deny that God
can create new things—new to the world, but not to Him—which
He never before created, but yet foresaw from all
eternity? If they say that it is indeed true that ransomed
souls return no more to misery, but that even so no new thing[Pg 513]
happens, since there always have been, now are, and ever shall
be a succession of ransomed souls, they must at least grant
that in this case there are new souls to whom the misery and
the deliverance from it are new. For if they maintain that
those souls out of which new men are daily being made (from
whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so delivered
that they never return to misery) are not new, but have
existed from eternity, they must logically admit that they are
infinite. For however great a finite number of souls there
were, that would not have sufficed to make perpetually new
men from eternity,—men whose souls were to be eternally
freed from this mortal state, and never afterwards to return to
it. And our philosophers will find it hard to explain how there
is an infinite number of souls in an order of nature which
they require shall be finite, that it may be known by God.

And now that we have exploded these cycles which were
supposed to bring back the soul at fixed periods to the same
miseries, what can seem more in accordance with godly reason
than to believe that it is possible for God both to create new
things never before created, and in doing so, to preserve His
will unaltered? But whether the number of eternally redeemed
souls can be continually increased or not, let the
philosophers themselves decide, who are so subtle in determining
where infinity cannot be admitted. For our own part,
our reasoning holds in either case. For if the number of
souls can be indefinitely increased, what reason is there to deny
that what had never before been created, could be created?
since the number of ransomed souls never existed before, and
has yet not only been once made, but will never cease to be
anew coming into being. If, on the other hand, it be more
suitable that the number of eternally ransomed souls be definite,
and that this number will never be increased, yet this number,
whatever it be, did assuredly never exist before, and it cannot
increase, and reach the amount it signifies, without having some
beginning; and this beginning never before existed. That this
beginning, therefore, might be, the first man was created.

21. That there was created at first but one individual, and that the human
race was created in him.

Now that we have solved, as well as we could, this very[Pg 514]
difficult question about the eternal God creating new things,
without any novelty of will, it is easy to see how much better
it is that God was pleased to produce the human race from the
one individual whom He created, than if He had originated it
in several men. For as to the other animals, He created some
solitary, and naturally seeking lonely places,—as the eagles,
kites, lions, wolves, and such like; others gregarious, which
herd together, and prefer to live in company,—as pigeons,
starlings, stags, and little fallow deer, and the like: but
neither class did He cause to be propagated from individuals,
but called into being several at once. Man, on the other
hand, whose nature was to be a mean between the angelic and
bestial, He created in such sort, that if he remained in subjection
to His Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His
commandments, he should pass into the company of the angels,
and obtain, without the intervention of death,[560] a blessed and
endless immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by
a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he should become
subject to death, and live as the beasts do,—the slave
of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death.
And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly,
that he might be a solitary bereft of all society, but that by
this means the unity of society and the bond of concord might
be more effectually commended to him, men being bound
together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection.
And indeed He did not even create the woman that
was to be given him as his wife, as he created the man, but
created her out of the man, that the whole human race might
derive from one man.

22. That God foreknew that the first man would sin, and that He at the same
time foresaw how large a multitude of godly persons would by His grace
be translated to the fellowship of the angels.

And God was not ignorant that man would sin, and that,
being himself made subject now to death, he would propagate
men doomed to die, and that these mortals would run to such
enormities in sin, that even the beasts devoid of rational will,
and who were created in numbers from the waters and the
earth, would live more securely and peaceably with their own[Pg 515]
kind than men, who had been propagated from one individual
for the very purpose of commending concord. For not even
lions or dragons have ever waged with their kind such wars
as men have waged with one another.[561] But God foresaw also
that by His grace a people would be called to adoption, and
that they, being justified by the remission of their sins, would
be united by the Holy Ghost to the holy angels in eternal
peace, the last enemy, death, being destroyed; and He knew
that this people would derive profit from the consideration
that God had caused all men to be derived from one, for the
sake of showing how highly He prizes unity in a multitude.

23. Of the nature of the human soul created in the image of God.

God, then, made man in His own image. For He created
for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that
he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which
were not so gifted. And when He had formed the man out
of the dust of the earth, and had willed that his soul should
be such as I have said,—whether He had already made it,
and now by breathing imparted it to man, or rather made it
by breathing, so that that breath which God made by breathing
(for what else is “to breathe” than to make breath?) is
the soul,[562]—He made also a wife for him, to aid him in the
work of generating his kind, and her He formed of a bone
taken out of the man’s side, working in a divine manner.
For we are not to conceive of this work in a carnal fashion,
as if God wrought as we commonly see artisans, who use their
hands, and material furnished to them, that by their artistic
skill they may fashion some material object. God’s hand is
God’s power; and He, working invisibly, effects visible results.
But this seems fabulous rather than true to men, who measure[Pg 516]
by customary and everyday works the power and wisdom of
God, whereby He understands and produces without seeds
even seeds themselves; and because they cannot understand
the things which at the beginning were created, they are
sceptical regarding them—as if the very things which they
do know about human propagation, conceptions and births,
would seem less incredible if told to those who had no experience
of them; though these very things, too, are attributed
by many rather to physical and natural causes than to the
work of the divine mind.

24. Whether the angels can be said to be the creators of any, even the least
creature.

But in this book we have nothing to do with those who do
not believe that the divine mind made or cares for this world.
As for those who believe their own Plato, that all mortal
animals—among whom man holds the pre-eminent place, and
is near to the gods themselves—were created not by that most
high God who made the world, but by other lesser gods
created by the Supreme, and exercising a delegated power
under His control,—if only those persons be delivered from
the superstition which prompts them to seek a plausible
reason for paying divine honours and sacrificing to these gods
as their creators, they will easily be disentangled also from
this their error. For it is blasphemy to believe or to say
(even before it can be understood) that any other than God
is creator of any nature, be it never so small and mortal.
And as for the angels, whom those Platonists prefer to call
gods, although they do, so far as they are permitted and commissioned,
aid in the production of the things around us, yet
not on that account are we to call them creators, any more
than we call gardeners the creators of fruits and trees.

25. That God alone is the Creator of every kind of creature, whatever its
nature or form.

For whereas there is one form which is given from without
to every bodily substance,—such as the form which is constructed
by potters and smiths, and that class of artists who
paint and fashion forms like the body of animals,—but another
and internal form which is not itself constructed, but,
as the efficient cause, produces not only the natural bodily[Pg 517]
forms, but even the life itself of the living creatures, and
which proceeds from the secret and hidden choice of an intelligent
and living nature,—let that first-mentioned form be
attributed to every artificer, but this latter to one only, God,
the Creator and Originator who made the world itself and the
angels, without the help of world or angels. For the same
divine and, so to speak, creative energy, which cannot be
made, but makes, and which gave to the earth and sky their
roundness,—this same divine, effective, and creative energy
gave their roundness to the eye and to the apple; and the
other natural objects which we anywhere see, received also
their form, not from without, but from the secret and profound
might of the Creator, who said, “Do not I fill heaven
and earth?”[563] and whose wisdom it is that “reacheth from
one end to another mightily; and sweetly doth she order all
things.”[564] Wherefore I know not what kind of aid the angels,
themselves created first, afforded to the Creator in making
other things. I cannot ascribe to them what perhaps they
cannot do, neither ought I to deny them such faculty as
they have. But, by their leave, I attribute the creating and
originating work which gave being to all natures to God, to
whom they themselves thankfully ascribe their existence.
We do not call gardeners the creators of their fruits, for we
read, “Neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that
watereth, but God that giveth the increase.”[565] Nay, not even
the earth itself do we call a creator, though she seems to be
the prolific mother of all things which she aids in germinating
and bursting forth from the seed, and which she keeps rooted
in her own breast; for we likewise read, “God giveth it a
body, as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own
body.”[566] We ought not even to call a woman the creatress
of her own offspring; for He rather is its creator who said to
His servant, “Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew
thee.”[567] And although the various mental emotions of a
pregnant woman do produce in the fruit of her womb similar
qualities,—as Jacob with his peeled wands caused piebald
sheep to be produced,—yet the mother as little creates her[Pg 518]
offspring, as she created herself. Whatever bodily or seminal
causes, then, may be used for the production of things, either
by the co-operation of angels, men, or the lower animals, or
by sexual generation; and whatever power the desires and
mental emotions of the mother have to produce in the tender
and plastic fœtus, corresponding lineaments and colours; yet
the natures themselves, which are thus variously affected, are
the production of none but the most high God. It is His
occult power which pervades all things, and is present in all
without being contaminated, which gives being to all that is,
and modifies and limits its existence; so that without Him
it would not be thus or thus, nor would have any being at
all.[568] If, then, in regard to that outward form which the
workman’s hand imposes on his work, we do not say that
Rome and Alexandria were built by masons and architects,
but by the kings by whose will, plan, and resources they were
built, so that the one has Romulus, the other Alexander, for
its founder; with how much greater reason ought we to say
that God alone is the Author of all natures, since He neither
uses for His work any material which was not made by Him,
nor any workmen who were not also made by Him, and
since, if He were, so to speak, to withdraw from created things
His creative power, they would straightway relapse into the
nothingness in which they were before they were created?
“Before,” I mean, in respect of eternity, not of time. For
what other creator could there be of time, than He who
created those things whose movements make time?[569]

26. Of that opinion of the Platonists, that the angels were themselves indeed
created by God, but that afterwards they created man’s body.

It is obvious, that in attributing the creation of the other
animals to those inferior gods who were made by the Supreme,
he meant it to be understood that the immortal part was
taken from God Himself, and that these minor creators added
the mortal part; that is to say, he meant them to be considered
the creators of our bodies, but not of our souls. But
since Porphyry maintains that if the soul is to be purified,
all entanglement with a body must be escaped from; and
at the same time agrees with Plato and the Platonists in[Pg 519]
thinking that those who have not spent a temperate and
honourable life return to mortal bodies as their punishment
(to bodies of brutes in Plato’s opinion, to human bodies in
Porphyry’s); it follows that those whom they would have us
worship as our parents and authors, that they may plausibly
call them gods, are, after all, but the forgers of our fetters
and chains,—not our creators, but our jailers and turnkeys,
who lock us up in the most bitter and melancholy house of
correction. Let the Platonists, then, either cease menacing
us with our bodies as the punishment of our souls, or preaching
that we are to worship as gods those whose work upon us
they exhort us by all means in our power to avoid and escape
from. But, indeed, both opinions are quite false. It is
false that souls return again to this life to be punished; and
it is false that there is any other creator of anything in
heaven or earth, than He who made the heaven and the earth.
For if we live in a body only to expiate our sins, how says
Plato in another place, that the world could not have been
the most beautiful and good, had it not been filled with all
kinds of creatures, mortal and immortal?[570] But if our creation
even as mortals be a divine benefit, how is it a punishment
to be restored to a body, that is, to a divine benefit? And if
God, as Plato continually maintains, embraced in His eternal
intelligence the ideas both of the universe and of all the
animals, how, then, should He not with His own hand make
them all? Could He be unwilling to be the constructor of
works, the idea and plan of which called for His ineffable
and ineffably to be praised intelligence?

27. That the whole plenitude of the human race was embraced in the first man,
and that God there saw the portion of it which was to be honoured and
rewarded, and that which was to be condemned and punished.

With good cause, therefore, does the true religion recognise
and proclaim that the same God who created the universal
cosmos, created also all the animals, souls as well as bodies.
Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His[Pg 520]
own image, and, for the reason I have given, was made one
individual, though he was not left solitary. For there is
nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as
this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate,
either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it,
where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of
us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, that all men
might be derived from one, and that they might thus be
admonished to preserve unity among their whole multitude.
But from the fact that the woman was made for him from
his side, it was plainly meant that we should learn how dear
the bond between man and wife should be. These works of
God do certainly seem extraordinary, because they are the first
works. They who do not believe them, ought not to believe
any prodigies; for these would not be called prodigies did they
not happen out of the ordinary course of nature. But, is it
possible that anything should happen in vain, however hidden
be its cause, in so grand a government of divine providence?
One of the sacred Psalmists says, “Come, behold the works
of the Lord, what prodigies He hath wrought in the earth.”[571]
Why God made woman out of man’s side, and what this first
prodigy prefigured, I shall, with God’s help, tell in another
place. But at present, since this book must be concluded, let
us merely say that in this first man, who was created in the
beginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently,
but in God’s foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so
far as regards the human race. For from that man all men
were to be derived—some of them to be associated with the
good angels in their reward, others with the wicked in punishment;
all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment of
God. For since it is written, “All the paths of the Lord are
mercy and truth,”[572] neither can His grace be unjust, nor His
justice cruel.

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